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ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effect of extensive internal control audit experience on 
internal control evaluation. Prior studies have examined the effect of industry 
experience on specific audit knowledge and the effect of general audit experience on 
internal control knowledge/performance. However, there has been no known study 
that examines the effect of extensive internal control audit experience on multiple 
measures of internal control performance. Extensive internal control audit experience 
includes compliance based audit experience and financial institution audit experience. 
Auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience perform a higher 
level of compliance testing compared to auditors with predominantly substantive 
based audit experience. Auditors with financial institution audit experience are more 
frequently exposed to internal control review due to the audit requirement specified in 
AGS 1008, Audit Implications of Reserve Bank Prudential Reporting Requirements. 
Due to the frequent exposure to internal control review, auditors with these extensive 
audit experiences are expected to attain a higher level of knowledge accuracy, 
consensus between subjects and self insight within subjects. The study also examines 
the effect of the level of knowledge on internal control evaluation. It is predicted that 
subjects with a higher level of knowledge will attain a higher level of consensus and 
self insight. 
Results indicate that there are significant differences in the levels of knowledge 
accuracy, consensus and self insight between student and auditor subjects except for 
the level of consensus between auditors with predominantly substantive based audit 
experience and students. Auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
V 
experience exhibit a significantly higher level of consensus compared to auditors with 
predominantly substantive audit experience but neither a higher level of knowledge 
accuracy nor self insight. There are no significant differences in the performance of 
auditors with and without financial institution experience. Furthermore, there are no 
significant differences in the level of accuracy of consensus and self insight between 
the high knowledge group and the low knowledge group. 
The results indicate that compliance based audit experience may be a useful factor in 
training an auditor to become an expert in internal control evaluations, as evidenced 
by firstly, the significant differences in the level of consensus between auditors with 
compliance based audit experience and auditors with substantive based audit 
experience; and secondly, the lack of significant difference in the level of consensus 
between auditors with predominantly substantive audit experience and students. 
Furthermore, it is clear that some experience as opposed to no experience plays a key 
role in the accumulation of knowledge and performance of internal control evaluation. 
vi 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
OBJECTIVE 
This study evaluates whether extensive internal control experience enhances the 
development of a more accurate internal control knowledge relative to internal control 
knowledge acquired through general internal control experience. It also investigates if 
a more accurate level of knowledge is associated with a higher level of consensus 
between auditors' internal control evaluations and a higher level of self insight within 
auditors' assessments of their internal control evaluations. 
Accuracy refers to the correspondence between a decision maker's prediction and the 
actual realization (Murray and Regel 1992, p. 127). In this study, accuracy is a 
measure of internal control knowledge as derived from an internal control objective 
test. The test requires respondents to determine which of the several responses 
provides a correct evaluation of internal control adequacy. Accurate knowledge is 
assessed as involving correct responses to the test. Consensus relates to the extent to 
which different individuals agree in their assessments and is expressed as agreement 
between pairs of subjects (Ashton 1985, pp. 174-175). Judgement insight relates to 
the degree of self insight into the relative weighting of internal control indicators of 
the internal control task within individual auditors (Hamilton and Wright 1982, p. 
757). 
The extensive internal control experiences that are examined in the study include: 
i 
1. audit experience where greater reliance is placed on the client's internal control 
structure; and 
2. audit experience with financial institutions in Australia. 
According to Bedard (1989, P.  122 ), " ... through experience, expert auditors may 
have developed more complete knowledge, better cross-reference and better memory 
organisation ... ". Particularly, auditors of clients with reliable internal control 
structures perform more internal control reviews compared to auditors of clients with 
less reliable internal control structure. Furthermore, in view of the emphasis placed 
on reporting internal control adequacy as required by Auditing Guidance Statements 
AGS 1008, Audit Implications of Reserve Bank Prudential Reporting Requirements', 
where there is an emphasis on compliance testing, auditors of financial institutions are 
more exposed to internal control reviews than are auditors of non-financial 
institutions. In view of the more frequent exposure to internal control evaluation, 
auditors with either of the above extensive internal control audit experience should 
develop a higher level of accuracy in internal control knowledge and possess greater 
expertise to perform internal control evaluation compared to auditors with only 
general audit experience. 2 
Auditing Guidance Statement AGS 1008, Audit Implications of Reserve Bank Prudential Reporting 
Requirements, requires auditors of financial institutions to report specifically on internal control 
adequacy in addition to reporting the traditional opinions on the truth and fairness of the financial 
statements. Internal controls means management's philosophy and operating style, and all the policies 
and procedures adopted by management to assist in achieving the entity's objectives (Statement of 
Auditing Standard AUS 402, Risk Assessments and Internal Controls, para .10). 
2 While auditors of financial institutions are more exposed to writing internal control review reports, 
that does not necessarily, mean that they are exposed to more internal control reviews compared to 
auditors who are not required to submit internal control review reports. However, it is assumed that 
with the additional internal control reporting requirement, the auditors would pay more attention to the 
internal control review function. Therefore, the internal control reporting requirement is expected to 
have an indirect effect on the knowledge and performance of internal control reviews via the additional 
attention paid to internal control reviews. 
2 
Hamilton and Wright (1982, P.  757) stated that: 
"a major assumption made is that a primary determinant of improved expertise 
in an area of expert judgement is experience. Measures of improved expertise 
include consensus of judgements, stability of judgements, relative weighting of 
information, and subjects' degree of self insight into their relative utilisation of 
information". 
This study does not directly adopt the Hamilton and Wright assumption, but applies 
the model developed by Libby and Tan (1994). The Libby and Tan (1994) expertise 
model assumes a direct experience effect on knowledge and subsequently, a direct 
knowledge effect on performance. This study tests whether greater experience leads 
to greater accuracy in knowledge and further evaluates the assumption of a knowledge 
effect on consensus and self insight of the internal control task. Hamilton and Wright 
(1982) tested for the existence of a direct experience effect on performance as 
measured by the levels of consensus and self insight. This study extends Hamilton 
and Wright (1982) by also testing for a direct experience effect on knowledge 
accuracy and a consequential indirect knowledge effect on consensus and self insight. 
Auditors who have extensive internal control experience are more exposed to internal 
control reviews and therefore, are expected to be experts at internal control 
evaluations. In contrast, auditors with general experience but lacking in extensive 
internal control experience are less exposed to internal control reviews and are 
expected to possess less expertise in internal control evaluations. Students with no 
audit experience have no exposure to internal control reviews and are, by definition, 
novices. Experts are expected to attain a higher level of accuracy in internal control 
knowledge, a higher level of consensus and greater self insight in internal control 
evaluations compared to the non-experts and novices. 
3 
This study investigates the linkage between extensive internal control experience and 
internal control knowledge/performance, which has not been examined in previous 
studies. Extensive internal control experience includes audit experience of clients 
with a reliable internal control structure and financial institution audit experience. 3 
The effect of general experience is also examined. Students, who have less general 
audit experience are expected to have less accurate internal control knowledge, a 
lower level of consensus in their evaluations of internal controls and possess a lower 
level of self insight in their internal control evaluations than auditors with general 
experience. 
MOTIVATION 
The effect of extensive internal control experience on auditors' internal control 
knowledge/performance has been selected as the focus of this study for three reasons. 
First, the issue is important since internal control knowledge/performance has the 
potential to significantly affect the effectiveness and efficiency of audits. Auditors 
generally evaluate the strength of the internal control in order to determine the extent 
of audit work necessary for a particular client engagement (Gaumnitz et al 1982, p. 
745). The primary purpose of the internal control review is to enable the auditor to 
determine the nature, the timing and the extent of audit procedures to be applied 
(Ashton 1974, p. 144). In a competitive environment, it is important that an accurate 
3 Financial institution audit experience can also be described as specific audit experience. The specific 
nature of the audit is attributable to the specific nature of its operations, transactions and financial 
statement presentation which is dissimilar to the other industries. However, for the purposes of this 
thesis, financial institution audit experience will be classified as extensive audit experience. Compared 
to substantive based and non-financial institution audits, both complianced based and financial 
institution audits require more extensive internal control reviews. As such, they are termed extensive 
audit experience. 
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internal control assessment is conducted as the extent of the subsequent substantive 
testing procedures is highly dependent on that review. An inaccurate assessment will 
lead to audit inefficiencies and/or ineffectiveness. Substantive audit work performed 
will be insufficient when the internal control risk is assessed as lower than actual; or 
excessive when the internal control risk is assessed as higher than actual. 4 Therefore, 
internal control assessment is a critical foundation of the audit process. 
Second, recent bank failures and business losses have been attributed to the lack of 
internal control within companies. The Barings debacle in Singapore 5 and the Daiwa 
bank downfall in Tokyo 6 have received worldwide attention, emphasizing the 
importance of understanding the factors affecting internal control assessments. The 
losses suffered by both of the above-mentioned financial institutions were caused by 
unauthorised transactions in derivatives by single traders. The conventional wisdom 
has been that internal controls in financial institutions were far too tight to permit such 
scandals from occurring. As such, the events have stunned international financial 
circles. These and other audit failures have rekindled professional and legislative 
interest in auditors' responsibilities to assess and/or report on internal control 
' It is recognised that there will be no resulting inefficiencies in the audit work performed when the 
actual internal control risk is higher than assessed and no errors have occurred. Less audit work has 
been performed as there was a low expectation of error occurrence. Refer to Gill G. S. and Cosserat G. 
W., 1993, p. 258. 
5 Keen (1995, p. 5); Bloomberg and NY Times as reported in Financial Review, 12 September 1995. 
Nick Leeson, a trader with Barings Futures Singapore, incurred losses amounting to US$1.39 billion 
which brought down Barings, Britain's oldest merchant bank, in February 1995. The losses were 
uncovered by the auditors but were not identified as fraudulent transactions as the computer entries 
were faked, bank statements and confirmations were falsified. The apparent accuracy of the 
transactions and records led the auditors to issue an unqualified audit report. The management of 
Barings has been criticised for allowing an inexperienced trader such as Leeson to accumulate huge 
losses and continue to finance his operations despite danger signs. 
6 The Mercury, 28 August 1995, p. 23. Toshihide Iguchi, an executive vice president at Daiwa Bank's 
New York office was charged with falsifying records in connection with US$1.47 billion in losses. 
Iguchi was accused of eleven years of unauthorised trading. 
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adequacies. 7 These cases indicate the significance of the external auditors' role in 
relation to the adequacy of internal control over financial instrument trading. 
Third, despite the importance of the issues examined in this study, they have not been 
researched to date. Prior studies have examined the effect of industry experience on 
specific audit knowledge 8 and the effect of general audit experience on internal 
control knowledge/performance. 9 However, there have been no known studies that 
examine the effect of extensive audit experience on multiple measures of internal 
control performance. In this study, compliance based audit experience or financial 
institution audit experience is used as a proxy for extensive internal control audit 
experience. A reliable internal control structure allows the auditors to place reliance 
on the client's internal control structure and thus, the audit procedure will be 
compliance based. Financial institutions are generally assessed as having a higher 
level of audit risk and thus, are subjected to more extensive compliance audit 
requirements than are non-financial institutions as evident in the level of regulatory 
7 Refer to Keen (1995, p. 5) whereby past and present personnel of financial institutions and audit firms 
addressed the important issues arising from the Barings case. 
8Ashton (1991) investigated the effect of industry experience on error-frequency knowledge. In relation 
to financial institution, it was hypothesized that more experienced auditors in financial institution audits 
acquire more accurate financial institution error frequency knowledge through experience and thus, 
there will be a difference in the accuracy of that knowledge between the more and less experienced 
auditors. There were no significant results for the experience effect on error frequency knowledge 
within the banking industry. 
9 Studies of the experience effect, as measured by number of years of experience or tenure, on internal 
control evaluation include Ashton (1974), Ashton and Brown (1980), Ashton and Kramer (1980), 
Gaumnitz et al (1982), Hamilton and Wright (1982) and Libby and Tan (1994). However, the results of 
these prior studies are not conclusive. For a review of studies examining internal control judgements, 
see Trotman and Wood (1991, pp. 186-187). Refer to Bedard (1989, pp. 117-118) and the literature 
review chapter of this thesis for the results of the prior research. Plausible reasons for the differing 
results could be due to differences in the ways in which knowledge was measured (Bonner, Davis and 
Jackson 1992); or the proxy used to represent expertise. These studies have routinely collected 
information relating to the years of audit experience that are used as a surrogate for expertise (Bedard, 
1989). Other surrogates used in studies of audit experience effects included education background 
(Bonner, Davis and Jackson, 1992), size of firms audited (Hackenbrack, 1993), industry and number of 
clients audited (Ashton, 1991). The literature on the measurement of knowledge and the different 
surrogates of experience used in the various studies are discussed later in this thesis. 
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monitoring and the level of reporting requirements. 1° Both the above mentioned types 
of extensive internal control audit experience require more extensive/detailed internal 
control reviews compared to general audit experience. Exposure to internal control 
reviews is expected to affect the internal control knowledge and internal control 
evaluation performance. This study investigates the effect of extensive audit 
experience on internal control knowledge and performance. 
OVERVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY 
The study compares the internal control evaluations of three subject groups: 
1) auditors with extensive internal control experience (auditors with financial 
institution audit experience or auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience), 
2) auditors without extensive internal control experience (auditors with general 
experience or auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience); and 
3) students with no practical audit experience. 
Surveys are used for data collection. The instrument comprises four parts. The first 
section obtains responses in relation to the internal control objective violated for each 
of the eight errors/irregularities in an order entry/sales system. This section serves to 
test the accuracy of the subjects' internal control knowledge by comparing the 
responses collected from the subjects to the model answers derived by Tubbs (1992, p. 
792). The second section requires the subjects to evaluate the strength of the internal 
lu Refer to Auditing Guidance Statement AGS 1008 Audit Implications of Reserve Bank Prudential 
Reporting Requirements and Statement of Auditing Standard AUS 402, Risk Assessments and Internal 
Controls. 
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control structure of sixteen independent cases on a scale of 1, extremely weak to 7, 
strong. Each case contains a list of five control statements which have been pre-
answered "yes" or "no". There are sixteen responses, 1 per case, for each subject. 
The responses of the subjects are correlated to determine the level of consensus for 
each subject and the mean correlation is computed for each group. The levels of 
consensus in each group are then compared. The third section requires subjects to 
allocate 100 points across the five internal control statements used in section two. 
The allocated points relate to the perceived level of importance of each control. The 
allocation provided here is used to determine the level of self insight in relation to the 
internal control evaluations made in each of the cases for the second section. The 
fourth section collects demographic information about the subjects. This information 
is used to determine each subject's experience, extensive or general, which facilitates 
the analysis of the responses in the appropriate classification. 
FINDINGS 
Results indicate that auditors who audit clients with reliable internal control structure 
(predominantly compliance based audit experience) attain significantly higher levels 
of consensus in internal control evaluations compared to auditors who audit clients 
without reliable internal control structure (predominantly substantive based audit 
experience). The level of knowledge accuracy and self insight do not differ 
significantly between these two groups of auditors. When compared to students, the 
auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience attain higher levels of 
knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight. Likewise, auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience attain significantly higher levels of 
8 
knowledge accuracy and self insight but not significantly higher levels of consensus in 
internal control evaluations than the students. 
Although financial institution auditors do not out perform non-financial institution 
auditors, both financial institution and non-financial institution auditors exhibit higher 
levels of knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight in internal control 
evaluations compared to students. 
Prior research indicates that experience is a factor in determining the level of 
expertise. The results here not only confirm the findings of prior research but also 
extend prior research by identifying compliance based audit experience as a 
determinant of expertise in internal control evaluation. 
SIGNIFICANCE 
The outcome of the study has several implications. First, this study provides evidence 
that auditors with extensive internal control experience, measured by compliance 
based audit experience, exhibit a higher level of expertise in relation to the level of 
consensus in their internal control evaluations. As such, auditors could be assigned to 
clients whose audits are primarily compliance based, (i.e. with a reliable internal 
control structure) to develop their internal control knowledge and internal control 
evaluation capabilities. 
Second, the results provide justification for accounting firms to supplement the 
training needs of auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience to 
develop their knowledge and performance in internal control evaluation. 
9 
Third, equipped with a level of expertise in internal control evaluation, auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience could command a higher salary and 
better promotional opportunities than auditors with predominantly substantive audit 
experience, ceteris paribus. 
ORGANISATION OF DISSERTATION 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 comprises a discussion of the 
institutional background in relation to internal controls and financial institutions. This 
is followed by the literature review in Chapter 3 and; the theoretical model and 
hypotheses development in Chapter 4. The methodology is then outlined in Chapter 5 
and the results are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides a summary and 
discussion of the study. 
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CHAPTER 2: INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of: 
1) the regulatory auditing requirements in relation to internal control reviews, 
2) the regulation of financial institutions, and 
3) the reporting requirement of internal control adequacy in financial institutions. 
This overview emphasizes the importance of internal controls within financial 
institutions, thus emphasising the significance of the research issue to auditors, 
auditees and other beneficiaries of the audit process. 
INTERNAL CONTROL 
In Australia, Statement of Auditing Standard AUS 402, Risk Assessments and Internal 
Controls, states that" ... auditors shall obtain an understanding of the internal control 
structure sufficient to plan the audit and develop an effective audit approach. The 
auditor should use professional judgement to assess audit risk and to design audit 
procedures to ensure it is reduced to an acceptable low level ... (para .02)". An 
effective internal control structure assists management in ensuring that, as far as 
practical, the conduct of business is orderly and efficient (para .15). Consequently, 
auditors can rely on the client's internal control structure to reduce their substantive 
work. 
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The internal control structure consists of the control environment, accounting system 
and control procedures (AUS 402, para .10). An understanding of each is required in 
order to assess audit risk using the audit risk model, which is derived from AUS 306 
and UAS 402), in which AR = IR X CR X DR where AR is audit risk, IR is inherent 
risk, CR is control risk and DR is detection risk. Assuming auditors are prepared to 
accept only a given level of audit risk, an understanding of the internal control 
structure is required to determine the level of reliance on the auditee's internal control 
structure and the amount of substantive testing required to form the audit opinion. 
There is an inverse relationship between audit risk and the amount of evidence needed 
to support the auditor's opinion on the financial report, i.e. the lower the level of audit 
risk to be achieved, the greater the amount of evidence needed." Conversely, inherent 
and control risks are directly related to the amount of evidence needed. 
According to AUS 402 (para .34): 
" ... When control risk is assessed as high, the auditor places emphasis on 
obtaining evidence through the performance of substantive procedures...". 
Furthermore, according to AUS 402 (para .39): 
" ... The auditor should obtain audit evidence through tests of control to support 
any assessment of control risk that is less than high. The lower the assessment 
of control risk, the more support the auditor should obtain that the internal 
control structure is suitably designed and operating effectively..." 
Less evidence is needed when inherent and control risks are low because in such cases 
detection risk can be high while a given level of audit risk is achieved, nonetheless, by 
I I Gill and Cosserat (1993, p. 189). 
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virtue of low detection or internal control risks. When control risk is accurately 
assessed as high, the auditor is able to expand substantive procedures and, thereby, 
reduce detection risk in order to maintain a proper level of total audit risk. On the 
other hand, if control risk is accurately assessed to be low, the auditor can place 
reliance on the client's internal control structure and perform less extensive 
substantive procedures in order to achieve greater audit efficiency whilst keeping total 
audit risk at an acceptably low leve1. 12 
Benefits accrue to the client as the pricing of the audit service is dependent upon the 
amount of work and level of tests that are performed by the auditors. Once the fee has 
been set or a constraint on the amount of audit fee exists, auditors need to identify the 
most cost efficient method of performing audit procedures to derive the best recovery 
for the audit. Inaccurate assessments of control risk lead to more ineffective or 
inefficient audits. The greater the accuracy of the control risk assessment, the greater 
the benefits to both the client and the auditor. 
Various studies and commissions in the area of corporate governance have also 
addressed the internal control issue. In 1978, the Cohen Report recommended that 
management should be required to report on internal control with attestation of the 
report by auditors. Some ten years later, the Treadway Commission (US, 1987) 
renewed the call for management reports on the effectiveness of internal control and 
acknowledged management's responsibility for establishing, monitoring, evaluating 
12 • bid . Auditors may perform fewer numbers of more economical substantive procedures; fewer 
numbers of lesser economical substantive procedures or greater numbers of more economical 
procedures. 
13 
and reporting on the internal control structure. I3 In 1988, Statement of Accounting 
Standard, SAS 55, which dealt specifically with internal control risk assessment 
issues, was issued in the US. In 1992, there was also an abundance of interest in 
internal control issues exhibited by organisations in various countries, such as the 
Cadbury Committee (UK), the Ryan Commission (Ireland) and the report on Audit 
Expectations Gap in the United Kingdom issued by The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (UK). 
The Cadbury Committee attempted to allocate responsibility for ensuring the 
existence of an adequate internal control structure between the Board of Directors and 
auditors. The committee recommended that directors should report on the 
effectiveness of the internal control system and that the auditors should attest to their 
statement. I4 Extending the concept of director's responsibility, the Ryan Commission 
asserted that the directors, regardless of the company size, have the responsibility of 
maintaining a system of internal control which has been designed to give reasonable 
assurance that transactions are executed in accordance with management's 
authorisation, that assets are safeguarded, that fraud is prevented and that proper 
financial records are maintained. I5 The Audit Expectations Gap in the United 
Kingdom issued by The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
expanded the auditor's scope of responsibility from a credibility assessment function 
13 The Australian Society of CPAs and Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia. 1993. A 
Research Study on Financial Reporting and Auditing - Bridging the Expectation Gap. Australia: 76. 
14 Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. 1992. Report of the Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. Cadbury Committee. London: Gee and Co. Ltd: 5. 
15 The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland. 1992. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Expectations of Users of Published Financial Statements. Ryan Commission. Dublin: ICAI: 81. 
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to one of evaluating and reporting on the standards of a company's internal control 
system and its operational performance. I6 
Within Australia, the importance of internal control in the auditing environment is 
reflected not only in professional guidance but also in the recent judgement in Daniels 
& Ors v AWA Ltd. I7 In this case, the defendants and the banks submitted that "no 
monitoring policy worthy of the name was laid down" such that there was a distinct 
lack of an internal control structure relating to monitoring of foreign exchange 
activities. 8 It was left wholly to senior management to determine and to implement 
what they thought was appropriate in relation to the foreign exchange transactions. 
Having determined the lack of an adequate internal control structure, the auditors did 
not perform further compliance work. The defendants in this case conceded that a 
duty may arise for the auditors to report on internal control weaknesses if to do so was 
incidental to the performance of a statutory audit. 
Given that there is no guidance on the requirements to inform the directors when 
internal control weakness are uncovered during the audit process, the auditors were 
thus not obligated to report on the internal control weaknesses. Roger C J (1992, p. 
962) was of the opinion that: 
" ... as a result of the auditor's study and evaluation of internal control and other 
audit procedures, the auditor may become aware of weaknesses in internal 
control. For the benefit of the client, the auditor should make management 
aware, on a timely basis, of material weaknesses which have come to his 
attention. Such weaknesses are usually communicated in writing. It is 
important to indicate in the letter addressed to the management that it discusses 
only weakness which have come to the attention of the auditor as a result of his 
16 Humphrey et al (1992, p. 83). 
"(1995) 13 ACLC pp. 614-743. 
18 (1992) 10 ACLC p.948. 
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audit and that his examination has not been designed to determine the adequacy 
of internal control for management purposes ... ". 
In Australia, a potential benefit accrues to the shareholder from the reporting on 
internal control procedures. The reporting requirement ensures at least an annual 
review of the internal control structure. Any internal control weaknesses uncovered 
during the review would be brought to the attention of the management which 
provides an avenue for improvement of the internal control structure. This acts as an 
added protection against the massive losses suffered when inadequate controls allow 
for fraud. In turn, the reporting on internal control adequacy could mitigate the 
eventual impact of the failure of organisations such as in the Barings and Daiwa cases. 
However, it should be noted that rational investors are usually more concerned with 
their dividend returns and capital gains than the well being of the company, per se. 
Although institutional investors generally have resources to be equipped with more 
information compared to the individual investors, institutional investors have 
generally taken a non-interventionist approach to the management of public 
companies and have deliberately chosen to "vote with their feet". 19 This is in 
accordance with portfolio theory whereby investors are likely to diversify their risk by 
investing in a variety of firms. 2° Furthermore, costs such as audit costs and lobbying 
costs may deter investors from imposing any additional reporting requirements on the 
company. Therefore, it is expected that the investors will not voluntarily require the 
companies to be subjected to internal control audits and will leave the internal control 
requirement in the hands of the legislators. 
19 Tomasic and Bottomly (1993, p. 154). 
21) Watts and Zimmerman (1986, p. 194). 
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
According to Jeffrey (1992, P.  808), auditors are accountable for their judgements to 
superiors, to the client and to the outside users of financial statements. In the case of 
clients within a regulated industry, such as financial institutions, the auditors are not 
only accountable to regulators such as the Australian Securities Commission and the 
Australian Stock Exchange, they also accountable to other regulators such as the 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Various reasons for the increased monitoring imposed on financial institutions are 
possible. First, the level of ignorance among managers of companies using complex 
transactions puts shareholders in vulnerable positions should both the external 
auditors and management lack understanding of the transactions and the risks 
involved. 2I Second, the banking system is perceived to be too important to the 
Australian economy to be left unmonitored. The public is protected by close 
monitoring via regulation. 22 Furthermore, there would be high levels of publicity and 
associated firm (auditor and auditee) reputation damage should there be an audit 
failure in this industry. There could also be adverse effects on the country's economy 
and/or financial reputation as evident in the recent Barings case (Keen 1995, p. 5). In 
The Report of the Board of Banking Supervision Inquiry into the Circumstances of the 
Collapse of Baring, it was acknowledged that" ... there is a need for improvement in 
the existing framework of regulation in the UK ... ". 23 In Australia, the Barings 
disaster has made companies and regulatory authorities wary of the use of derivatives. 
21 The issue on the lack of understanding of the derivative products were raised in two articles, 
Heywood (1995) and Keen (1995). 
22 Refer to The Commonwealth Bank Act 1951, The Commonwealth Bank Act 1959, The Reserve Bank 
Act 1959, The Banking Act 1959-89. 
17 
A series of accounting exposure drafts and guidance papers have been released or 
revised since the Baring collapse, reinforcing the intensity and urgency of this issue. 24 
In view of the extent of public debate about the cause of derivative disasters attributed 
to the lack of internal control and the increased attention paid to the internal control• 
structures of regulated industries, it is likely that a more cautious approach would be 
adopted in the conduct of audits in relation to internal control in financial institutions. 
INTERNAL CONTROL ADEQUACY IN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Due to the high volume of similar transactions that takes place in financial 
institutions, audit strategies tend to have a heavier emphasis on tests of controls than 
on substantive testing. The focus of internal control in relation to the impact of its 
reliance on audit work has now been expanded, thereby increasing its importance in 
the audit process. Audit standards promulgated in the USA have extended the 
purpose of the internal accounting control review to include consideration of material 
internal accounting control weaknesses (IACWs) and communication of these IACWs 
and their effects to the client's board of directors. Other standards also require the 
auditor to disclose material IACWs in engagements in which an opinion concerning 
the adequacy of IAC is rendered by the auditor (Mayper 1982, p. 773). There is a 
similar requirement in Australia as stipulated in AGS 1008 but only in relation to 
financial institutions. 
23 Return to an Order of the Honourable The House of Commons (1996, P.  251). 24  Examples include Exposure draft 65, Presentation and Disclosure of Financial Instruments which is 
now approved for issue as an accounting standard and the report , Auditing the Treasury Function, 
produced by the Australian Society of CPAs which offers guidance and comprehensive check points for 
auditing derivatives. 
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One of the financial institution auditor's duties, according to AGS 1008 (para .12 and 
.13(a)), is to "express an opinion as to whether, based on professional observation and 
experience, the bank's internal management systems and controls are generally 
adequate". The auditor's report to the client bank on this specific matter will then be 
forwarded to the Reserve Bank. Furthermore, Auditing Guidance Statement AGS 
1010, Audit Obligations of the Financial Institutions Scheme, states that " ... the 
Prudential Standards, pursuant to Section 285(10), require an auditor of a Building 
Society or Credit Union to provide a report of compliance on ... internal controls 
(annually) ... " (para .09b). 
The 1989 prudential supervision provisions of the Banking Act were included to deal 
with the protection of depositors, to ensure that the banks do not engage in excessively 
risky behaviour and to keep the Reserve Bank informed of the operations of the 
banks. 25 The prudential supervision of the banks is without doubt one of the most 
important functions of the Reserve Bank. 26 
Although the financial industry has undergone substantial deregulation, the financial 
institutions are still subjected to a higher level of internal control review compared to 
non-financial institutions. Continuing on this basis, several hypotheses in the current 
study focus on the effects of financial institution experience on internal control 
knowledge/performance. 
25 Slay and Clark (1993, p. 39). 
26 ibid. 
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Guidance provided in AGS 1008 requires auditors of financial institutions to report 
specifically on internal control adequacy in addition to reporting the traditional 
opinion on the truth and fairness of the financial statements. The auditors of non-
financial institutions are required only to review the internal control of their clients to 
plan and determine the appropriate nature, timing, and extent of substantive testing. 
The additional requirement for auditors to express an opinion on the adequacy of the 
internal control within financial institutions is posited to reinforce the general internal 
control knowledge and performance for those auditors. 
In the USA, private sector financial institutions and corporations are required to 
obtain annual audits but the auditors have the option of expanding the scope of the 
control assessment procedures in order to derive an opinion on the adequacy of the 
internal control procedures. By contrast, public sector organisations receiving more 
than $100,000 federal financial assistance are required to obtain an audit that reports 
opinions on the adequacy of internal controls, compliance with laws and regulations 
as well as the opinion on the fairness of the financial statements. Other private and 
public sector organisations have the option to expand audit scope and receive an 
opinion on internal control but very few exercise the option to do so. 
SUMMARY 
The internal control reporting requirement of auditors or management has been 
addressed and debated in various countries. The losses and failures such as those 
suffered by Barings and Daiwa banks have escalated these common concerns. In view 
of the attention placed on internal control in financial institutions, this study regards 
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auditors of financial institutions as possessing a level of internal control evaluation 
expertise greater than that of other auditors. 27 
27  It must be also be recognised that evidence of financial institution failures may indicate, to the 
contrary, that auditors of financial institutions lack internal control evaluations expertise. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of: 
1) studies which examined the impact of general experience on internal control 
performance; and 
2) research which later progressed to examine not only the impact of general 
experience on internal control performance but also the impact of general 
experience on internal control knowledge and/or ability. 
This review assists in the identification of the link between extensive internal control 
experience and internal control knowledge/performance. 
EXPERIENCE EFFECTS ON INTERNAL CONTROL PERFORMANCE 
Ashton (1974) studied the judgements made by independent auditors relative to 
internal control systems. The major purpose of his seminal research was to determine 
the extent of judgement consistency in the evaluations by individual auditors of a 
hypothetical internal control situation. It was expected that there would be variations 
in the judgement by the same auditor at different points in time (consistency) and 
differences across auditors (consensus). A descriptive model of each auditor's 
judgements was constructed in order to provide a partial explanation for the extent of 
inconsistent internal control judgements which might be observed. The experimental 
task required the subjects to make thirty-two internal control judgements on a scale 
from one (extremely weak) to six (adequate to strong) as a function of thirty two 
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different combinations of "yes" and "no" answers to six questions (26 combination 
whereby there are two options for each of the six questions, of which only half are 
selected for experimentation purposes based on fractional replication). 28 Based on a 
one-half fractional replication of a 2 6 factorial design, thirty two of the sixty four 
combinations were chosen as case studies for inclusion in the questionnaire. 
Ashton's six questions relate to six payroll internal control indicators (Table 1 reports 
an internal control case utilised in his study). Subjects consisted of sixty-three 
practising auditors who were employed by four accounting firms. The task was 
administered twice in order to assess the consistency of judgement over time. Two 
types of consistency were evaluated - consensus (consistency across auditors at the 
same point in time) and stability (consistency over time for the same auditor using the 
same data). Results provided experimental evidence that the judgements of the sixty 
three subjects exhibited a fairly high level of consensus, 0.7. The mean correlation for 
the high experience group and the low experience group were 0.72 and 0.68 
respectively. 
28 Cochran and Cox (1957, pp. 244-249). According to Cochran and Cox (1957, p. 152), using 
factorial experiments, the magnitude of the task can be reduced by testing only a fraction (e.g. one-half 
or one-quarter) of the total number of treatment combinations. An experiment which consists of only 
part of a complete replication allows the investigator to discover the results of the experiments in a 
more timely and cost effective manner. 
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TABLE 1 AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTERNAL CONTROL CASE USED IN 
ASHTON (1974) 
Yes No 
1. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of employees 
adequately separated from the payroll preparation? 	 X 
2. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment of employee 
adequately separated from the task of payroll bank account 	X 
reconciliation? 
3. Are the names on the payroll checked periodically against the active 
employee file of the personnel department? 	 X 
4. Are formal procedures established for changing names on the payroll, 
pay rates and deductions? 	 X 
5. Is the payroll audited by internal auditors? 	 X 
6. Was the internal control over payroll found to be satisfactory during 
the previous audit? 	 X 
extremely 	very 	substantial 	some 	not quite 	adequate to 
weak 	weak 	weakness 	weakness 	adequate 	strong 
1 	2 	3 	4 	5 	6 
Source : Ashton (1974, An Experimental Study of Internal Control Judgements, 
Journal of Accounting Research, p. 155, Table 1) 
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Ashton and Kramer (1980, P.  1) extended Ashton (1974) to assess whether students 
are reasonable surrogates for the practising auditors in tasks involving decision 
making. Analysis of results focused on the extent to which the two subject groups, 
students and auditors with no more than three years of experience, differed on several 
measures of judgement and the extent to which these differences could be explained 
by experience. The experiment consisted of a student replication of the Ashton (1974) 
study of internal control judgements by independent auditors. Thirty students were 
the subjects in this study. The mean correlation for the level of consensus for the 
student subjects was 0.58. Compared to the 0.72 and 0.68 mean correlation for high 
and low experience subjects in Ashton (1974), the results implied that having some 
experience, as opposed to no experience, was more important than the specific amount 
(one, two or three years) of experience held by auditors. The self insight index for 
auditor and student subjects were 0.89 and 0.77 respectively and there was a 
significant positive correlation between years of experience and level of self insight. 
However, according to Ashton and Kramer (1980, p. 11), " ... eleven of the thirty tests 
reported revealed statistically significant differences while the other nineteen tests 
suggest no differences ... If one goes beyond statistical tests and considers the general 
directionality in the data, it appears that the students were adequate surrogates for the 
auditors... ". 
Ashton and Brown (1980) replicated and further extended this line of research by 
examining changed cue sets. The task used in the 1980 study differed from that used 
by Ashton (1974) and Ashton and Kramer (1980) in that two additional cues were 
added to the six originally used by Ashton (1973), resulting in one hundred and 
twenty eight cases (2 8 possible combinations of two yes/no options for each of the 
25 
eight questions, whereby only half were adopted for the testing purposes based on the 
factorial replication rationale). 29 The analysis indicated that judgement consensus and 
insight: 
1) are greater for auditors having between one and three years of experience than for 
auditing students, 
2) did not differ for auditors in the one-to-three year experience range, and 
3) are greater for auditors having more than three years of experience than for those 
having less than three years of experience. 
Hamilton and Wright (1982) extended studies of auditors' performance on 
assessments of internal control for payroll systems by including a broader range of 
experience levels and a larger percentage of relatively experienced auditors. Hamilton 
and Wright (1982) used a task and situation similar to the one used in Ashton (1974), 
Ashton and Kramer (1980) and Ashton and Brown (1980). Their study considered 
explicitly the relationship between: 
1. years of experience and 
2. judgement consensus, the stability of judgements over time and; the degree of self 
insight into the relative weighting of internal control indicators. 
The consensus levels for the low and high experience groups were 0.73 and 0.71 
respectively. The results indicated a low negative correlation between consensus and 
years of experience (rs = -0.20), a low positive correlation between self insight and 
years of experience (rs = 0.26) and a small difference in the weighting of internal 
control indicators by the subjects (sum of average ETA coefficients is 0.703, 0.734 
29 Refer to footnote 26. 
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and 0.773 for student, inexperienced and experienced subjects respectively). 
Of the four studies mentioned above, both positive and negative but generally weak 
relationships between experience and consensus have been found. In relation to self 
insight, only Hamilton and Wright (1982) found a low positive correlation between 
experience and level of self insight within the auditor subjects. These prior studies 
failed to provide consistent support for the belief that increasing audit experience 
leads to higher levels of expertise in relation to internal control assessments among 
auditors, although differences were detected between auditors and students. 
EXPERIENCE EFFECTS ON KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE 
Bonner and Lewis (1990) noted that most studies of expertise divided subjects into 
groups of experts and novices on the basis of years of experience or tenure-based 
titles. Bonner and Lewis (1990) explored a view of expertise in which specific 
experiences and training create knowledge. They expected knowledge and ability to 
explain more of the variation in performance than years of audit experience. 
Using their model, Figure 1 illustrates the effect of knowledge and mental ability on 
performance whereby knowledge is combined with innate ability to perform specific 
audit tasks. Three types of knowledge, general domain knowledge, subspecialty 
knowledge and world knowledge; and an additional type of ability, general problem 
solving ability, were identified as potential determinants of expertise. Bonner and 
Lewis (1990) also noted that most of the published studies have examined general 
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domain knowledge. 3° Their study examined the specific types of knowledge and 
ability necessary to perform accurately on each of the four audit tasks relating to 
internal controls, ratio analysis, manipulation of earnings and interest rate swaps. 31 
The results showed that more experienced auditors, on average, performed better in 
the tasks and had more knowledge and ability related to the task. The results further 
indicated, however, that the general experience variable explained less than 10% of 
the variance in performance scores. Very specific measures of knowledge or task 
specific experience and training often provided the best explanations of expertise. For 
example, the variable that best explained variations in performance of tasks associated 
with interest rate swaps was having the experience of auditing clients who engaged in 
such swaps. 
30 • According to Bonner and Lewis (1990, P.  3), general domain knowledge is defined as knowledge 
gained by most persons in a domain through instruction and experience. Subspecialty knowledge is 
acquired through formal instruction and experience, but only by persons in the subspecialty area. 
World knowledge is gained through life experience and instruction and is not likely to be possessed 
equally by persons of equal experience. 
• In the internal control task, subjects were given a specific weakness in the internal controls over 
accounts payable. The subjects were required to, first, list two financial statement errors that could 
occur and not be detected by the control system, then, list two substantive audit procedures that would 
be useful in detecting such errors. In the ratio analysis task, subjects were given a particular pattern of 
unexpected deviations in financial ratios and were required to (1) determine a single accounting error 
that could account for all of the unexpected changes in the ratios, (2) list the accounts affected by the 
error, (3) state whether the accounts were over or under stated, and (4) explain how errors in those 
accounts affect the related financial ratios. In the manipulation of earnings task, subjects were required 
to determine the income effects for the two years involved given a particular pattern of errors in the 
timing of sales recognition. In the interest rate swap task, subjects were given details about an 
agreement and were required to name the type of transaction and propose an acceptable accounting 
treatment for it. 
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Knowledge 
- General Domain 
- Subspecialty 
- World Performance 
FIGURE 1 EFFECT OF KNOWLEDGE AND MENTAL ABILITY ON 
PERFORMANCE 
Mental Abilit 
The Bonner and Lewis (1990) conceptual model adapted from Libby and Luft (1993, Determinants of 
Judgement Performance in Accounting Settings : Ability, Knowledge, Motivation and Environment, 
Accounting, Organisations and Society, p. 433, Fig 2) 
Libby and Luft (1993), in a descriptive paper, suggested a more complete model than 
that examined in Bonner and Lewis (1990). The model recognised that: 
1) there are only two classes of inputs in the model (abilities and experiences), 
2) these two inputs cause the internal state of knowledge which is an intermediate 
output variable, and 
3) along with the direct effects of abilities, knowledge affects performance (an output 
variable). 
Consequently, one should not expect all experienced auditors to show superior 
performance on all tasks. The level of expertise in a specific task is dependent on the 
types of abilities and experiences an auditor possess. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of 
experience and mental ability on knowledge and ultimately performance, as modeled 
by Libby and Luft (1993). 
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FIGURE 2 THE EFI-E,CT OF EXPERIENCE AND MENTAL ABILITY ON 
KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE 
Experience  	Knowledge 
Mental Ability 	 Performance 
Antecedents and consequences of knowledge (Libby and Luft, 1993, Determinants of Judgement 
Performance in Accounting Settings : Ability, Knowledge, Motivation and Environment, Accounting, 
Organisations and Society, p. 433, Fig 3) 
Applying the model in Figure 2 whereby the audit judgement task allows different 
knowledge and abilities to be acquired, Libby and Tan (1994) constructed separate 
conceptual models for separate audit tasks. Libby and Tan (1994) extended the 
Bonner and Lewis (1990) and Libby and Luft (1993) studies by developing a 
framework to predict the structure and strength of knowledge, ability, experience and 
performance for different tasks; the internal control task, ratio analysis task, earnings 
manipulation task and the financial instrument task. The tasks in Libby and Tan 
(1994) are similar to the tasks in Bonner and Lewis (1990). The internal control task 
requires the detection of errors arising from deficiencies in the internal control system, 
and identification of substantive tests that can be used to detect these errors. The ratio 
analysis task requires the detection of a single low-frequency accounting error that can 
explain the pattern of ratio changes. The earnings manipulation task requires the 
identification of a reason for irregularities in the accounts, and the financial 
instrument task requires the identification and specification of journal entries related 
to an interest rate swap. 
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According to Libby and Tan (1994, P.  703), 
"... experience creates opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge, while 
ability and effort determine the amount of knowledge acquired given that 
experience. This knowledge acquired, along with ability and effort, then 
directly affects performance. This performance in one period in turn affects 
what an individual experiences in the next period ..." 
In relation to the internal control task, Libby and Tan (1994) classified the knowledge 
as moderately complex and as being acquired during the first three years of an 
auditor's career. Therefore, knowledge and general experience are predicted to have 
an effect on the performance of the internal control task. Furthermore, the task is 
described as structured, the problem is well defined, the alternative solutions and 
relevant information as well specified; and no computations or backward reasoning 
are required. As such, no effects of problem-solving ability on knowledge or 
performance are predicted in the model. Figure 3 describes the Libby and Tan (1994) 
performance model in relation to the direct effects of general audit experience on 
internal control knowledge and finally, on performance. 
FIGURE 3 EFFECTS OF GENERAL AUDIT EXPERIENCE ON INTERNAL 
CONTROL KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE 
General Experience -10. Knowledge 
‘11 ! 
Performance 
Model of Performance of Internal Control Evaluation Task (Libby and Tan, 1994, Modeling the Determinants of 
Audit Expertise, Accounting, Organisations and Society. p. 706, Fig 3a) 
In Libby and Tan (1994), specific results for the internal control model indicated that 
general experience, operationalised as months of audit experience, had direct effects 
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on performance for the internal control evaluation task which suggested the possibility 
of automaticity developing from experience. General experience also had an impact 
on the development of knowledge relevant to task performance. Furthermore, the 
ability-knowledge link and ability-performance link were not significant which 
confirmed the prediction that there was no ability effect on performance and 
knowledge in respect to the internal control task. The knowledge-performance link 
was significant when self ratings were used as a measure of knowledge but was not 
significant when knowledge was measured by an objective knowledge test. 
The studies cited above classified internal control knowledge as general domain 
knowledge. Furthermore, only general experience is predicted to have an effect on 
internal control evaluation knowledge and performance. As indicated in the previous 
chapter, this study continues to investigate internal control knowledge and 
performance, but predicts that extensive internal control experience -reinforces the 
internal control knowledge. The level of knowledge has an ultimate effect on the 
performance of the internal control task. Audit experience of clients with reliable 
internal control structures and financial institution audit experience serve as two 
proxies for extensive internal control experience. This concept is explored in more 
detail in the theoretical model development chapter. 
SUMMARY 
Early research has generally investigated the effect of experience operationalised by 
years of experience on internal control judgement based on the instrument developed 
by Ashton (1974). More recent work has included the knowledge and ability variables 
32 
to explain variances in internal control evaluations. To date, there has been no study 
investigating the effect of extensive audit experience on internal control knowledge 
and internal control evaluation, where extensive audit experience includes audit 
experience of clients with reliable internal control structure and financial institution 
audit experience. 
The most predominant instrument that has been utilised in prior studies is the set of 
hypothetical internal control situations developed by Ashton (1974), whether in the 
original or modified form. A modified version of the instrument developed by Ashton 
(1974) is used in this study. Its structure and content are described in detail in Chapter 
V. The common measures of expertise, such as tenure and years of experience, are 
also examined to determine the impact of general experience on internal control 
knowledge/judgement. The following chapter develops hypotheses predicting the 
nature of this effect. 
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CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL MODEL AND 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This study extends the internal control model by Libby and Tan (1994) in at least three 
ways. First, in addition to general experience, a second input variable (extensive 
internal control experience) is predicted to affect the intermediate variable, internal 
control knowledge, and the output variable, performance of the internal control task. 
Second and as a consequence of the first extension, the experience variable is 
operationalised using compliance based audit experience and financial institution 
audit experience. These variables have not been operationalised as such in prior 
research. It is proposed that both types of experience assist in explaining the factors 
affecting internal control knowledge and performance. Third, consensus has 
traditionally been treated as a surrogate for accuracy as a performance measure. This 
study treats accuracy and consensus as different concepts. It links the level of 
accuracy of internal control knowledge and level of consensus in internal control task 
performance. It is predicted that high knowledge accuracy leads to high levels of 
consensus and self insight in the performance of the internal control task. 
Prior research has investigated the relation between general experience and internal 
control knowledge and/or performance. In contrast, this study examines the effects of 
extensive internal control experience on the internal control knowledge and 
performance model. This relation is expected to exist due to the need for extensive 
compliance testing prior to placing reliance on the client's internal control structure, 
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and the additional emphasis on compliance testing in financial institution audits due to 
the additional reporting requirement on internal control adequacy in AGS 1008. 
EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE EFFECTS ON KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE 
Most studies of expertise have divided subjects into groups of experts and novices on 
the basis of years of experience or tenure-based titles (Bonner and Lewis 1990, p. 2). 
Others have viewed auditor expertise in terms of the kinds of knowledge and ability 
acquired through variations in: 
1) the firm (Gaumnitz et al, 1982; Hamilton and Wright, 1982; Bonner, 1990; and 
Spires, 1991), 
2) industry experience (Ashton, 1991; and Libby and Tan, 1994), 
3) client size (Ashton, 1991; and Hackenbrack, 1993). 
Different clients present different challenges to their auditors. For clients with 
adequate internal control structure in place, auditors place a greater reliance on the 
internal control structure and perform more compliance testing relative to substantive 
testing. The frequent exposure to internal control reviews is termed compliance based 
audit experience. The compliance based audit experience, through emphasis on the 
internal control structure will also reinforce the knowledge of the auditor and enhance 
the performance of the auditor in relation to internal control audits. 
Furthermore, the prudential supervision performed by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
requires financial institutions to develop an adequate internal control structure. Due to 
the internal control reporting requirements imposed by the Reserve Bank of Australia 
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and the adequacy of internal control structure expected to exist in financial 
institutions, auditors of financial institutions perform more extensive than usual 
evaluations of internal control structure compared to non-financial institution auditors. 
According to Tubbs (1992, p. 786), 
"... the development of error knowledge is likely to be a function of specific 
audit experiences, discussion of audits with colleagues, supervision and 
review of work by superiors, case materials used in training programs, the 
following of audit plans, and the use of audit guides. Advanced activities 
such as the supervision of subordinates and designing actual audit plans are 
likely to reinforce and, perhaps, enhance error knowledge..." 
Auditors with financial institution experience are more exposed to internal control 
review, an outcome of the internal control reporting requirement and the reliance on 
the client's internal control structure. Auditors with financial institution experience 
perform more compliance testing to provide the basis for their report on internal 
control and thus, have a higher reliance on their clients' internal control structure or at 
least a more detailed knowledge of it. As such, financial institution experience is 
expected to reinforce and enhance internal control knowledge and performance. 
The Libby and Tan (1994) internal control model suggested a general audit experience 
effect on knowledge and performance. This study extends the Libby and Tan (1994) 
model by incorporating the extensive internal control experience variables. The 
extensive internal control experience variables are operationalised by: 
1. the relative audit time devoted to compliance based audit, and 
2. the relative audit time exposure to financial institution audits. 
Figure 4 illustrates the predicted direct effect of general and extensive audit 
experience on internal control knowledge and performance. 
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FIGURE 4 GENERAL AND EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE - INTERNAL CONTROL 
KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE MODEL 
General Audit Experience 	 Internal Control Knowledge 	Performance 
Extensive Internal Control Audit Experience 
-compliance based audit experience 
-financial institution audit experience 
Accuracy Measure 
According to Tubbs (1992, p. 786), research in psychology has demonstrated that a 
person with more experience in a substantive area has more items stored in memory. 
Therefore, as auditing experience is gained, the number of errors known by the auditor 
is expected to increase. Weber and Crocker (1983) have also shown that increased 
experience results in a more accurate and more complicated category structure. 
Furthermore, according to Libby and Frederick (1990, p. 352), one of the most basic 
findings in memory research is that repetition of an item eases its subsequent retrieval 
and results in frequency learning. As such, accurate knowledge of a subject matter is 
predicted to be an important factor which allows the more experienced subject to 
outperform the inexperienced one. 
In applying the above reasoning and findings to the case of internal control, increased 
extensive internal control experience in terms of compliance based audit experience or 
financial institution audit experience is expected to provide auditors with extensive 
opportunities to acquire internal control knowledge. Since auditors with extensive 
internal control audit experience are more exposed to internal control evaluations, 
they are expected to attain a higher level of accuracy in internal control knowledge. 
The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with extensive internal 
control audit experience is expected to be higher than auditors without extensive 
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internal control audit experience and even higher than for students without any 
practical audit experience. 
Therefore, the hypotheses can be stated in alternative form as: 
11 1a_, : The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience is higher than for auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience. 
Hiaii : The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience is higher than for students with no 
practical audit experience. 
I-1 a-Iii : The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience is higher than for students with no 
practical audit experience. 
Hib_i : The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with financial 
institution audit experience is higher than for auditors who have not audited financial 
institutions. 
1-1 1b-ii The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors with financial 
institution audit experience is higher than for students who have no practical audit 
experience. 
Flib_ii i The level of accuracy in internal control knowledge of auditors without 
financial institution audit experience is higher than for students who have no practical 
audit experience. 
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Consensus Measure 
The effect of knowledge on the development of expertise has been addressed 
extensively by researchers in psychology who posited that knowledge is gained 
through instructions and experience. Research using subjects such as chess masters 
(Chase and Simon, 1973) and bridge players (Charness, 1979) has found that experts 
have more general domain knowledge than novices. Einhorn (1974) also noted that 
general domain knowledge is necessary for expert performance. It follows that 
internal control knowledge, a general domain knowledge as classified by Bonner and 
Lewis (1990), is a necessary determinant for expert performance in internal control 
evaluations. 
Consensus has been frequently used as an indicator of decision accuracy in audit 
judgement research especially in audit tasks where there is no objective criterion 
against which to evaluate the judgements made (Trotman 1990, p. 40). Therefore, it is 
expected that high level of accuracy in internal control knowledge will lead to high 
level of consensus in internal control task performance. The hypothesis can be stated 
as: 
112a : The level of consensus in the internal control tasks performed by subjects with 
high internal control knowledge is higher than for subjects with low internal control 
knowledge. 
Hamilton and Wright (1982, p. 757) stated that: 
"... increasing situational experience and exposure to training programs over 
time should result in similar internal control evaluations, given essentially the 
same situations. For a judgement task where the same type of evaluation is 
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made repeatedly and the relationship between the cues and the criterion is 
basically the same over time, judgements should become increasingly 
stable..." 
Furthermore, based on the Einhorn (1974) proposition that experts should show high 
inter-judge reliability, it is also expected that extensive internal control experience 
will lead to a high level of accuracy in internal control knowledge and eventually, to a 
high level of consensus in internal control task performance. 
Consensus is expected to be derived from compliance based audit experience whereby 
there is reliance on the client's internal control structure. The level of consensus in 
the internal control task performed by auditors who predominantly rely on their 
clients' internal control structure (compliance based audit experience) is expected to 
be higher than the level of consensus in the internal control task performed by auditors 
who predominantly do not rely on their clients' internal control structure (substantive 
based audit experience) and students with no practical experience. The hypotheses 
can be stated as: 
H2b_i : The level of consensus in internal control tasks performed by auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience is higher than the auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience. 
112b-n : The level of consensus in internal control tasks performed by auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience is higher than the students with no 
practical audit experience. 
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The level of consensus in internal control tasks performed by auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience is higher than the students with no 
practical audit experience. 
Consensus is also expected to be derived from common financial institution audit 
experience. The level of consensus in the internal control task performed by auditors 
with financial institution audit experience is expected to be higher than the level of 
consensus in internal control tasks performed by auditors without financial institution 
audit experience and students without any practical audit experience. The hypotheses 
can be stated as: 
: The level of consensus in the internal control tasks performed by auditors with 
financial institution audit experience is higher than for auditors who have not audited 
financial institutions. 
1-12c-11 : The level of consensus in the internal control task performed by auditors with 
financial institution experience is higher than for students who have no practical 
auditing experience. 
H2c_111 The level of consensus in the internal control task performed by auditors 
without financial institution experience is higher than for students who have no 
practical auditing experience. 
Self Insight 
As outlined previously, greater accuracy implies greater consensus. Taking self 
insight as a proxy measure for performance, as with consensus, greater accuracy also 
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implies greater self-insight. Judgement or self insight relates to the degree of self 
insight into the relative weighting of internal control indicators of the internal control 
task within individual auditors (Hamilton and Wright 1982, p. 757). 
It is considered important to have a high degree of self insight because auditors often 
have to explain and discuss their judgements with others (Bedard 1989, P.  119). 
Moreover, continued use of a judgement model over time could provide better 
understanding concerning the relative impact of information cues on one's overall 
judgements, so that levels of self insight should also improve with experience 
(Hamilton and Wright 1982, p. 757). It is expected that a high level of accuracy in 
internal control knowledge will lead to a high level of self insight in internal control 
task performance. The hypothesis can be stated as: 
H3a : The level of self insight exhibited by subjects with high internal control 
knowledge is higher than for subjects with low internal control knowledge. 
According to Hamilton and Wright (1982, p. 757), continued use of a judgement 
model over time could provide better understanding concerning the relative impact of 
information cues on one's overall judgement, so that levels of self insight should also 
improve with experience. As such, auditors with extensive internal control experience 
are expected to have a higher level of self insight compared to auditors without 
extensive internal control experience and students without any practical experience. 
Auditors whose audit clients have good internal control structures place higher 
reliance on their internal controls. As such, auditors who predominantly rely on their 
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clients' internal control structure (compliance based audit experience) are more 
exposed to internal control reviews and would attain a higher level of self-insight. On 
the other hand, auditors who do not rely on their clients' internal control structure 
(substantive based audit experience) are less exposed to internal control reviews and 
would attain a lower level of self-insight. The hypotheses are stated as follows: 
H3b.; : The level of self insight of auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience is higher than for auditors with predominantly substantive based audit 
experience. 
H3b_ii : The level of self insight of auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience is higher than for students with no practical audit experience. 
113b-m : The level of self insight of auditors with predominantly substantive based audit 
experience is higher than for students with no practical audit experience. 
Another measure for extensive internal control audit experience is financial institution 
audit experience. Auditors with financial institution experience are more exposed to 
internal control evaluations and are expected to exhibit higher levels of consensus in 
their internal control evaluations compared to auditors without financial institution 
experience and students with no practical audit experience. The hypotheses can be 
stated as: 
H3c_i : The level of self insight exhibited by auditors with financial institutions audit 
experience is higher than for auditors who have not audited financial institutions. 
H3c _1i The level of self insight exhibited by auditors with financial institution audit 
experience is higher than for students who have no practical auditing experience. 
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H3c _1i1 The level of self insight exhibited by auditors without financial institution audit 
experience is higher than for students who have no practical auditing experience. 
SUMMARY 
Auditors with extensive internal control experience are more frequently exposed to 
internal control reviews and thus, are expected to accumulate a more complete and 
accurate internal control knowledge. With a higher level of accuracy in internal 
control knowledge or extensive internal control experience, these auditors will attain a 
higher level of consensus and self insight in the internal control task. Based on the 
assumption of improved expertise as measured by consensus and self-insight, auditors 
with extensive internal control experience are expected to perform better in internal 
control evaluations. There are, in total, twenty hypotheses tested as listed below: 
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Extensive Internal Control Experience Effect on Knowledge Accuracy 
Hi a_i Acmip > Ash 
Flia-ii Acomp > As 
Hia-iii Aso, > As 
Hin-1 AR > ANR 
H11,-1i AR > As 
Hib-iii ANFI > As 
Knowledge Effect on Consensus 
H2a 	CHK 	> 	CLK 
Extensive Internal Control Experience Effect on Consensus 
H2h-i CComp > CSuh 
H21,-1i CComp > CS 
H21,-i11 Cs, > CS 
I-12,1 CFI > CNFI 
H2c-ii CFI > • CS 
H2c-111 CNFI > Cs 
Knowledge Effect on Self-Insight 
H3a 	 SIHK 	> 
	
SILK 
Extensive Internal Control Experience Effect on Self-Insight 
H311-1 SIComp > SISuh 
H31,11 SIComp > SIS 
1431,.11 SISuh > Sls 
FIN:A SIFI > SINFI 
H3c-1i SIFI > Sls 
H3c-i11 SINF1 > Sls 
where: 
• A, C and SI denote the level of accuracy in internal control knowledge, level of 
consensus in internal control evaluations and level of self insight in internal 
control evaluations respectively. 
• HK and LK represent the auditors in the high and low knowledge groups 
respectively. 
• Comp and Sub represent auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience and auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience. 
• Fl, NFI and S represent auditors with financial institution audit experience, 
auditors without financial institution audit experience and students with no 
practical auditing experience respectively. 
45 
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter outlines the mail survey research method used to collect data to 
test the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. This is followed by a 
discussion of the selection of subjects and the questionnaire utilised in this study. The 
strengths and limitations of the research methodology are also recognised. 
METHOD 
Responses to one internal control knowledge test and two internal control task are 
conducted via mail survey instruments responded to by: 
1) auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience/financial 
institution audit experience, 
2) auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience/non-financial 
institution experience, and 
3) students without any practical audit experience. 
There are several possible methods of administering the questionnaire, including: 
1) personal interview 
2) telephone interview 
3) mail survey 
4) experiment 
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Personal and telephone interviews are infeasible as the questionnaire requires the 
subjects to perform internal control evaluations that are difficult for respondents to 
deal with unless they can read the questions and alternative responses. Experimental 
research is an alternative but it is time consuming and uneconomical to gather the 
subjects, especially the practising auditors, for the purpose of completing the 
questionnaire. 
The advantages of conducting a mail survey include geographic flexibility, reduced 
cost, respondent convenience and absence of interviewer bias. Compared to the other 
methods of conducting surveys, mail survey allows for access to more subjects in a 
wider geographical area. Mailing costs are lower than costs of telephone surveys or 
costs for travel to conduct experiments. The use of standard questions means that the 
questionnaires can be filled out at a time more convenient to the respondent. This 
increases both the rate and accuracy of responses, and reduces interviewer bias. 
However, there is little control over the return of the questionnaire and the speed of 
the response. 
Nevertheless, measures were implemented to ensure the majority of the subjects 
returned the questionnaires on a timely basis, to ensure a spread of subjects across the 
three groups and to facilitate prompt responses. These measures include the 
assistance of a contact person at the firm and the university participating in the 
questionnaire. The contact person is also provided with an instruction sheet in 
relation to the selection of subjects and the distribution of the questionnaire. 
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The criteria for the selection of the subjects was communicated to the contact person 
in writing. The selection is a stratified random selection requiring half the auditor 
subjects to have experience in auditing financial institutions. Given that the only 
constraint on the distribution is the financial institution experience criterion and 
subjects thereafter are randomly selected within the financial institution experience 
strata, the subjects should be representative of the various positions and levels of 
experience. 
The survey distribution approach undertaken is similar to that in Hamilton and Wright 
(1982). Two contact persons, one from the participating firm (either a partner, audit 
manager or training manager) and one from the university (lecturer-in-charge), were 
approached to establish the initial contact. Arrangements were made for the 
subsequent distribution of the questionnaires to the contact person and eventually, to 
the subjects. Written instructions were provided in relation to the selection of 
samples, distribution, collection and return of the questionnaires. Each aspect of this 
administration is described in greater detail later in the chapter. 
The contact person from the accounting firm provided the auditor subjects with a 
signed cover letter on the audit firm's stationery expressing the firm's support for this 
study and requesting that the subjects return the completed materials within two 
weeks. Where possible, for the practising subjects, an appropriate account number 
was included in the cover letter indicating the account for charging time spent 
completing the materials. All subjects were assured that they were not being evaluated 
based on their responses, and were requested to work independently. Anonymity of 
the responses is maintained by having the materials returned in unmarked and sealed 
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envelopes to the contact person. These envelopes were then collected by the contact 
person and forwarded to the researcher for analysis. Anonymity of the responses did 
not allow the identification of subjects who have not returned the questionnaires. 
However, follow up actions were undertaken by the contact person in the accounting 
firm with copies of the questionnaires attached to email messages. The email 
messages were sent a month after the first distribution of the questionnaire to all of the 
selected subjects instructing those who have not responded to return the completed 
questionnaire within the week. As the response rate was 100% for the students 
subjects, no follow up actions were required. 
SUBJECTS 
Sample sizes from prior research range from thirty one (Ashton and Brown, 1980) to 
as many as four hundred and fifty three (Ashton, 1991). 32 Auditor subjects for this 
study are drawn from one Big Six accounting firm in Australia. The Big Six 
accounting firms audit a number of financial institutions which allows a substantial 
number of their employee to specialise in the audit of financial institutions. It is 
expected that the Big Six accounting firms contain most of the personnel classified as 
specific financial institution audit specialists with substantial experience levels. The 
Melbourne and Sydney offices of one Big Six accounting firm were approached. The 
32 The number of subjects used are as follows: 63 auditors and 96 students in Abdolmohammadi and 
Wright (1987), 63 auditors in Ashton (1974), 30 students and 63 auditors in Ashton and Kramer 
(1980), 31 auditors in Ashton and Brown (1980), 453 auditors from 1 firm in Ashton (1991), 112 tax 
staff from various firms in Bonner, Davis and Jackson (1992), 35 auditors in Frederick (1991), 35 
auditors in Gaumnitz et al, 1982), 87 auditors from 1 firm in Hackenbrack (1993), 31 students and 78 
auditors in Hamilton and Wright (1982), 41 auditors from 1 firm in Jeffrey (1992), 191 auditors and 
students in Libby and Frederick (1990), 38 auditors from 5 firms in Mayper (1982), 85 auditors from 1 
firm in Moeckel (1990), 85 auditors from 1 firm in Moeckel and Plumlee (1989), 243 auditors from 4 
firms in Pratt and Stice (1994) and 72 auditors from 5 different firms in Tubbs (1992). 
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questionnaire was distributed to practising auditors. The final sample included fifty 
eight auditor subjects, a response rate of 28.5%. 
Student subjects for this study are drawn from an Australian university. The lecturer-
in-charge of the unit acted as the conduit of information. The final sample included 
eighty student subjects who were present at an Auditing lecture. These students had 
completed two weeks of specific studies of internal control evaluation and ten weeks 
of auditing in general (including aspects of internal control evaluation). 
DATA COLLECTION 
The instrument utilised for data collection has four sections which include the 
knowledge accuracy task, the consensus task, the self insight task and demographics 
details. 
Task 1 - Accuracy Measure 
The first section of the instrument provides eight errors/irregularities in a sales and 
receivables cycle of a manufacturing firm as devised by Tubbs (1992). 33 The subjects 
are required to identify the internal control objective violated in relation to each of the 
eight errors/irregularities. 
33 Tubbs (1992) required subjects to complete two tasks. The first task was an unconstrained free recall 
task whereby subjects were allowed fifteen minutes to list, in order of recall, as many different errors as 
possible that might occur in the sales-receivables-cash receipts cycle of a typical wholesaling or 
manufacturing company. In the second task, the subjects were provided with a list of eight errors in the 
sales, receivables and cash receipts cycle of a wholesaling or manufacturing firm. They were required 
to decide on the probability of each of those errors occurring. For the purpose of analysing the data, 
Tubbs (1992) drew up a comprehensive list of forty four errors that could occur in the sales-
receivables-cash-receipts cycle of a wholesaling or manufacturing firm by reviewing various auditing 
textbooks and audit manuals of five Big Eight firms. In the instrument utilised in this study, instead of 
requiring subjects to identify the probability of each of the errors occurring, the subjects were required 
to identify the internal control objectives violated for each error. 
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According to Tubbs (1992, P.  792), these errors/irregularities are classified according 
to the internal control objective violated. The eight items are selected for inclusion in 
the questionnaire based on the criterion that each of the eight errors violates only one 
of the following four control objectives: 
1) validity 
2) authorisation 
3) completeness 
4) valuation 
In this study, the subjects are provided with a list of eight errors/irregularities in the 
sales and receivables cycle of a wholesaling or manufacturing firm. 34 The subjects are 
required to identify the internal control objectives violated for each of the eight errors. 
The responses of the subjects are checked against a model answer for accuracy. This 
model answer provided by Tubbs (1992, p. 792) has been further supported by 
materials from the auditing text book, Arens A. A., Loebbecke J. K. And Shailer G. E. 
P., Auditing in Australia : An Integrated Approach (Prentice Hall, 1990) and is 
reported in Appendix 1. 
Task 2 - Consensus Measure 
The second section requires the subjects to evaluate the internal control structure of 
sixteen different variations of a payroll control situation independently. Each 
situation, hereafter referred to as a case, contains a list of five control statements or 
34 Refer to Appendix 2, Part one. 
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cues which have been pre-answered "yes" or "no"  .35 For each case, subjects are 
required to rate the strength of the internal control structure ranging from 1, extremely 
weak, to 7, strong. This section of the instrument is based on the methodology 
employed in Ashton (1974). 
According to Ashton (1974, p. 147), the payroll subsystem is appropriate for three 
reasons. First, the review of the payroll subsystem is important because it is a 
common component in the financial system of all companies. Second, the 
characteristics of an adequate payroll internal control should be familiar to all 
auditors. This method of identifying differences in internal control knowledge 
between different groups of auditors has been used in various studies such as Ashton 
and Brown (1980), Ashton and Kramer (1980), Hamilton and Wright (1982) and 
Trotman et al (1983). Third, the concept of internal control is generic and can be 
easily applied to all accounting cycles. It is expected that the results will be 
comparable to tasks involving internal control evaluations for other accounting cycles. 
The instrument developed by Ashton (1974) has been widely used by other 
researchers (Ashton and Brown, 1980; Ashton and Kramer, 1980; and Hamilton and 
Wright, 1982). The instrument consisted of thirty two cases based on six indicators of 
payroll internal control. The indicators read as follows: 
1. Are the tasks of both timekeeping and payment of employees adequately separated 
from the payroll preparation? 
2. Are the tasks of both payroll preparation and payment of employee adequately 
35 Refer to Appendix 2, Part two. 
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separated from the task of payroll bank account reconciliation? 
3. Are the names on the payroll checked periodically against the active employee file 
of the personnel department? 
4. Are formal procedures established for changing names on the payroll, pay rates 
and deductions? 
5. Is the payroll audited by internal auditors? 
6. Was the internal control over payroll found to be satisfactory during the previous 
audit? 
The instrument used in Ashton (1974) is not utilised in its original form in this study. 
Ashton's instrument was developed in the 1970s and does not address the practical 
implications of the 1990s. Furthermore, the questions are based upon characteristics 
of sound internal control discussed in Statements on Auditing Procedures, no. 33. It is 
necessary to modify the questions which are based on the US auditing context to suit 
an Australian context since the questionnaire is distributed in Australia. 
In Ashton (1974), the first four indicators address the issues of separation of duties, 
independent reconciliation, internal verification and authorisation; the fifth is 
concerned with the work of internal auditors and the sixth is concerned with the 
results of previous audits. It is necessary to modify the indicators to address all 
aspects of the internal control functions and the key internal controls in a balanced and 
structured manner, an objective which is not achieved in Aston (1974). The 
limitations of the instrument are discussed in later parts of this chapter, in conjunction 
with the comparison between the questions used in Ashton (1974) and in the current 
study. The evaluation task in Ashton (1974) is adopted in the present study but the 
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case studies are modified to address each individual payroll function and key internal 
control listed below. 
The payroll functions are classified into: 
1) personnel and employment 
2) timekeeping and payroll preparation 
3) payment of payroll 
4) preparation of fringe benefits tax, income tax and other items. 36 
The key internal controls are: 
1) separation of duties 
2) authorisation 
3) presence of independent reconciliation 
4) internal verification of calculation 
5) internal verification of account classification. 37 
The final five indicators are based on the matrix shown in Table 2 whereby each 
indicator addresses two payroll functions and one internal control. For example, 
question 1 addresses the internal control, authorisation and two payroll functions 
personnel and employment, and timekeeping and payroll preparation. 
The five questions that are utilised in the questionnaire are listed in Table 3. 
Questions 1 and 2 are similar to questions 4 and 1 in Ashton (1974) respectively. 
36 Arens, Loebbecke, Best and Shailer (1990, p. 560). 
37 ibid. p. 566. 
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Question 2 in Ashton (1974) addressed the issue of separation of duties between 
payment and bank reconciliation which has already been addressed in question 1 of 
that questionnaire. The current questionnaire required the presence of the bank 
reconciliation procedure in Question 4 instead. In the presence of modern 
computerised technology, Question 3 in Ashton (1974), "Are the names on the payroll 
checked periodically against the active employee file of the personnel department?", is 
redundant as the more likely procedure in place would be to check that employees 
who have resigned are deleted from the payroll list. Questions 5 and 6 in Ashton 
(1974) have been replaced by Questions 3 and 5 in the current questionnaire, 
addressing the issue of internal verification which was not dealt with completely in 
Ashton (1974). This is a key control required in accounting cycles. 
The five questions used in this study's questionnaire have been designed to 
comprehensively cover the major controls expected in payroll systems and require 
responses to a total of sixteen (2 5 of which half the combination are selected for 
testing based on factorial replication 38) combinations of the five questions. For each 
of the cases, each subject is required to assign an internal control evaluation based on 
a 7-point scale as follows: 
1, extremely weak 
2, very weak 
3, substantial weakness 
4, some weakness 
5, marginally adequate 
6, adequate 
7, strong 
38 Cochran and Cox (1957, pp. 244-249). 
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TABLE 2 CASE STUDY QUESTIONS EACH ADDRESSING TWO PAYROLL 
FUNCTIONS AND ONE KEY INTERNAL CONTROLS 
..Payioll"Functions‘:. 
. Listed Below are the 
.Key Internal 
Controls: 
Personnel & 
Employment 
Timekeeping & 
Payroll 
Preparation 
Payment of 
Payroll 
Preparation of 
Payroll, Fringe 
Benefits and 
Other Items 
Authorisation Q 1 Q I 
Separation of Duties Q2 Q2 
Internal Verification 
of Calculation 
Q3 Q3 
Independent 
Reconciliation 
. 	Q4 
Internal Verification 
of Accounting 
Classification 
Q5 Q5 
Q denotes question number 
TABLE 3 THE QUESTIONS USED IN THE INSTRUMENT WHICH WAS 
DISTRIBUTED TO AUDITOR AND STUDENT SUBJECTS 
I. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, pay rates and actual working 
hours (if applicable)? 
2. Are the task of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle adequately separated? 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross pay amounts and deduction? 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of amount stated in payroll 
preparation and actual amount paid? 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of accounting classification? 
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Consensus is measured as the average pairwise comparisons within each group of 
interest and then these averages are compared across the relevant groups. 
Task 3 - Self Insight Measure 
The third section requires subjects to allocate 100 points across the five listed internal 
control cues posed in the second part of the instrument adopted from Ashton (1974). 
The points related to the perceived level of importance of each control. The allocation 
provided here, subjective cue utilization, is used for determining the level of insight 
relative to the internal control evaluations made in each of the case studies for the 
second section, objective cue utilisation. 
Demographics 
The last section collects demographic information about the subjects for data analysis 
purposes. The information provided here allows the determination of the experience 
effect, as operationalised by industry, type of audit experience and number of years of 
audit experience on the internal control judgement. 
SUMMARY 
Data are collected using the mail survey method. The questionnaire was distributed 
and collected with the assistance of a contact person at the firm and at the university 
participating in the questionnaire. The questionnaire is based on the instrument used 
by Ashton (1974) and Tubbs (1992). It is illustrated in Appendix 2. The final sample 
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comprised fifty eight auditor subjects and eighty student subjects from one accounting 
firm and one university respectively. 
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CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter provides the descriptive statistics for the subjects who 
participated in the questionnaire. The data collected from the subjects are then 
analysed to test the hypotheses and finally, the results are summarised. 
The F test is used to analyse the data for the hypotheses in relation to the level of 
accuracy of internal control knowledge. The level of consensus between subject 
groups is determined using the Spearman Correlation. The level of self insight within 
subject groups is determined using a judgement research technique developed by 
Hoffman et al (1968) and used by Ashton (1974). First, a descriptive ANOVA is 
constructed for each subject. The omega squared, 002, for each cue is obtained from 
the ANOVA for each subject. The co2 indicates the level of reliance that the subject 
places on each cue when making the internal control judgements. There are five cues 
in each case and thus, there are five co 2 . The five co2 are correlated with the point 
allocation provided by that subject in Part Three of the questionnaire to obtain the self 
insight index. This procedure is repeated for all subjects to obtain a self insight index 
for each subject. The mean self insight indices for each subject group, for example 
financial institution auditors versus non-financial institution auditors, are then 
compared to determine the level of significant differences between the self insight 
indices of the two groups. 
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The results support twelve of the twenty hypotheses. There is no knowledge effect for 
the level of consensus or the level of self insight. In relation to auditors with 
predominantly compliance based audit experience, results indicate that these subjects 
possess a higher level of consensus compared to auditors with predominantly 
substantive audit experience but neither a higher level of self insight nor a more 
accurate internal control knowledge. There is no financial institution experience 
effect for the level of accuracy, level of consensus or the level of self insight. The 
results are highly supportive of the hypotheses involving students. All the hypotheses 
involving students, except the consensus hypothesis in relation to auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience versus students, were supported. 
This indicates highly significant differences between students and auditors for the 
level of accuracy in knowledge, level of consensus and level of self insight. 
PILOT TESTING 
A preliminary version of the questionnaire was pilot tested before the final 
distribution to the student and auditor subjects. The subjects who participated in the 
pilot test comprised twelve auditors from local accounting firms in Tasmania and ten 
students from a university in Australia. Of the twelve auditor subjects, there were 
eight partners and four managers. Minor changes were made to the first version to 
produce a second version of the questionnaire. The second version of the 
questionnaire incorporated the comments of the subjects and was reviewed by a 
partner of a local accounting firm in Tasmania. The subjects acknowledged that the 
questionnaire was in an understandable form to the auditors and the tasks were in line 
with the audit procedures carried out in an audit assignment. 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The final subject group comprises 58 auditors from one Big Six accounting firm with 
offices in Melbourne and Sydney; and 80 students who are completing the third year 
Auditing unit at an Australian university. The response rate from the auditors is 
28.5%, with 58 usable responses from the 200 questionnaires distributed. 49 
responses were obtained initially and a follow up resulted in another 9 responses. 39 
The response rate from the students is 100%, 80 responses, as the questionnaire was 
administered during the auditing lecture. The means are computed for the following 
variables: 
1. financial institution experience (FIEXP) ( x = 10.43 months), 
2. number of financial institutions audited (FI#) (x = 3.40 financial institutions 
audited), 
3. total experience (TTLEXP) ( x = 36.76 months); and 
4. score for Part One of the questionnaire (TEST) (x = 4.03 correct answers out of a 
maximum of 8). 
This is shown in Table 4, Panel A, along with details of the range and standard 
deviation for each measure. 
39 The difference between the number of responses received and the number of subjects for each 
relevant variable in Table 4 is due to the missing information not provided by the subjects. The 
discrepancy does not affect the results as discussed in Chapter 7, Limitations, p. 103. 
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TABLE 4 DESCRIPTIVE DATA - INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PANEL A: FOR ALL SUBJECTS 
aria hie 
Independent Variables: 
No. Std Dev Minimum 	Majamilm 
Fitt') Mths) 134 10.43 28.27 154 
FI# 134 3.40 18.22 200 
LEXP (Mths) 136 36.76 61.90 420 
Independcrit/Depcndent Variable*: 
TE8t 	 138 	4.03 	1.48 	0 	8 
PANEL B : FOR AUDITOR SUBJECTS ONLY 
a 	 No. 	 Std Dev 	 ximunN 
Independent Variables: 
ilEXP (Mths) 	54 25.89 39.97 0 
FI# 	 54 8.43 28.10 0 
rrLEXP (MAI) 	56 89.27 68.07 3 
Independent/Dependent Variable*: 
,174SIT 	 56 4.87 1.42 1 
FIEXP (Mths) - Number of months of financial institution experience 
FI# - Number of financial institutions audited 
TTLEXP (Mths) - Total number of months of audit experience 
TEST - Test score obtained based on the number of correct responses in relation to the internal control 
objective violated for each of the eight missing internal control (Part One of the questionnaire) 
*The test score is a dependent variable when investigating the level of knowledge accuracy of different 
subject groups but an independent variable when investigating whether there is a knowledge effect on 
the level of consensus and on the level of self insight. 
154 
200 
420 
8 
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4) subject type (Type), whether financial institution auditor (n = 24), non-financial 
institution auditor (n = 32), student with no practical audit experience (n = 80) and 
missing data (n = 2). 
The experience levels for the subjects of prior studies investigating expertise in the 
internal control task ranged from: 
1) 2 to 3 years of experience for the 63 auditor subjects in Ashton (1974) and Ashton 
and Kramer (1980), 
2) 1 to 3 years of experience for the 31 subjects in Ashton and Brown (1980); and 
3) 0 to 28 years of experience for the 78 auditors in Hamilton and Wright (1982). 
The current sample of 58 auditor subjects is within the scope of the sample size in 
prior studies which ranged from 31 to 78,. The subjects in the current sample are 
more experienced with a mean number of years of experience at approximately 7 
years compared to the three studies mentioned above. Most of the auditor subjects are 
at the manager level (n = 30) while the remaining 22 are at the supervisory level or 
below and 2 at director level. Therefore, the majority of the auditor subjects are 
relatively experienced in the field of audit with 38 auditor subjects, out of a total of 
58, having more than five years of audit experience. The current student subject 
group of 80 was relatively large compared to the student subject groups in the prior 
studies, which is approximately 30. 
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The computed means for auditor subjects only, as presented in Table 4, Panel B, are: 
1. financial institution experience (FIEXP) ( x = 25.89 months), 
2. number of financial institutions audited (FI#) ( x = 8.43 financial institutions 
audited), 
3. total experience (TTLEXP) ( x = 89.27 months); and 
4. score for Part One of the questionnaire (TEST) (x = 4.87 correct answers out of a 
maximum of 8). 
Generally, the distributions of the frequencies for the variables are skewed to the right 
for both analysis in Table 4, Panel A and B. The level of the peak is higher for the FI# 
frequency (s = 29.753, Kurtosis = 100.339) compared to the rest of the variables, 
FIEXP (s = 36.753, Kurtosis = 11.616) and TTLEXP (s = 70.999, Kurtosis = 12.694). 
Table 5 provides a frequency table for the following: 
1) positions held at the firm (Post); assistant (n = 4), senior (n = 8), supervisor (n = 
10), manager (n = 30), director (n = 2), students (n = 80) and missing data (n = 4); 
2) levels of total audit experience (TTLEXP) as to whether it is low (0-4 years of 
experience) where n = 18, medium (5 -7 years of experience) where n = 19, high 
(more than 8 years of experience) where n = 19, students (n = 80) and missing data 
(n = 2); 
3) compliance/substantive based audit experience (COMPEXP), auditors with 
predominantly compliance based experience (n = 19), auditors with predominantly 
substantive based experience (n = 36), students with no practical audit experience 
(n = 80) and missing data (n = 3); and 
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TABLE 5 DESCRIPTIVE DATA - FREQUENCIES OF DEPENDENT AND 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
CLASSIFICATION Frequency 
Independent Variables: 
POST 
- Assistant 4 
- Senior 8 
- Supervisor 10 
- Manager 30 
- Director 2 
- Student 80 
- Missing Data 4 
138 
TTLEXP 
- Low (0 to 4 years of experience) 18 
- Medium ( 5 to 7 years of experience) 19 
- High (more than 8 years of experience) 19 
- Students 80 
- Missing Data 2 
138 
COMVENT 
- preitnitiiiiantly compliance based 19 
- predominantly substantive based 36 
- students 80 
- Missing Data 3 
138 
TYPE 
- Financial institution auditor (Fl) 24 
- Non-Financial institution auditor (NFI) 32 
- Students 80 
Missing Data 2 
138 
Independent/Dependent V ariable*: 
TEST 
- > 4 correct answers 51 
- 4 or less correct answers 87 
138 
POST - Position held at audit firm 
TTLEXP - Total number of years of audit experience 
TYPE - Financial institution auditor or non financial institution auditor or student 
COMEXP - Compliance based audit experience or substantive based audit experience or no practical 
audit experience 
TEST - Test score obtained based on the number of correct responses in relation to the internal control 
objective violated for each of the eight missing internal control (part one of the questionnaire) 
*The test score is a dependent variable when investigating the level of knowledge accuracy of different 
subject groups but an independent variable when investigating knowledge effect on the level of 
consensus and self insight. 
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With reference to extensive internal control audit experience, 19 are auditors with 
predominantly compliance audit experience and 36 are auditors with predominantly 
substantive audit experience, while 24 of the current auditor subjects are financial 
institution auditors and 32 are non-financial institution auditors. A chi squared 
analysis was performed to determine the level of independence between the two 
variables, compliance audit experience and financial institution experience (see Table 
6). The results indicate that these two variables are not independent of each other (x 2 
= 7.25, p = 0.007). As such, financial institution experience is a reasonable proxy for 
compliance based audit experience. 
When the subjects are classified according to total audit experience and financial 
institution experience, the distribution is fairly even with approximately the same 
number of financial and non-financial institution auditors in each category of audit 
experience. The distribution is as follows: 
1. 7 and 10 financial and non-financial institution auditors respectively for the low 
experience group, 
2. 9 and 10 financial and non-financial institution auditors respectively for the 
medium experience group; and 
3. 8 and 12 financial and non-financial institution auditors respectively for the high 
experience group. 
The test scores from Part One of the questionnaire were slightly skewed with 51 
subjects obtaining more than four correct answers and 87 with less than four correct 
answers. 
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TABLE 6 CONTINGENCY TABLE FOR EXTENSIVE AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
VARIABLES 
FI auditor NFI auditor Total 
Compliance Audit Exp 13 6 19 
(6.1) (8.9) 
Substantive Audit Exp 11 25 36 
(13.9) (20.1) 
Total 24 31 55 
X2 = 7.25, p = 0.007 
Fl = Financial institution 
NFI = Non-financial institution 
Exp = Experience 
( ) = Figures in brackets are the expected frequency values 
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LEVEL OF ACCURACY OF INTERNAL CONTROL KNOWLEDGE 
The first part of the questionnaire requires subjects to identify the internal control 
objective violated in relation to the absence of each of eight internal controls. The 
subjects' responses to the first part of the questionnaire are checked against the model 
answer in Appendix One to determine the number of correct answers obtained by each 
subject and a test score is awarded to each subject. For every correct answer obtained, 
one mark is awarded. The minimum and maximum test scores that a subject can 
potentially obtain are 0 and 8 respectively. 
To test whether specific compliance based audit experience resulted in knowledge 
differences, HI a, the subjects are classified into the following groups: 
1) auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience, 
2) auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience; and 
3) students with no practical audit experience. 
Table 7 reports the mean test score for Part One of the questionnaire for each of the 
groups. It also reports the results of the comparisons of the mean test scores between 
the groups. 
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TABLE 7 LEVEL OF ACCURACY (MEASURED USING MEAN SCORE OF TEST IN 
PART ONE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE) 
Hy 	eses 
H 1 Extensive 
Groups Mean Std Dev 
audit experience effect on the level of accuracy of knowledge 
H 	, Auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience (nz--19) 
4.95 1.43 
AUdiftrSI.withI prèdorninantiv substantive based audit 
experience 03=36) 
4.86 1.44 
F = 0.0449 
1-tailed p = 0.417 
Auditors with predominantly compliance based ztudit 
experience (n=19) 
4.95 1.43 
Stiidents (n=80) 3.46 1.25 
F = 20.4162 
1-tailed p = 0.000 
Hia..ii Auditors with predominantl)- substantire based audit 
experience (n=36) 
4.86 1.44 
Students (n=80) 3.46 1.25 
F = 144519 
1-tailed p = 0.000 
1 	i A aditors with F1 Experience (n=24) 5.00 1.38 
Auditors without FL Experience n=32) 4.78 1.45 
F =0.3237 
1- tai1ed p = 0.286 
Auditors with FL Experience n=24) 5.00 1.38 
Stints (n=84) 3.46 1.25 
F =26S143 
1-tailed p = 0.000 
11113 Auditors without El Experience n=32) 4.78 1.45 
Students (n=80) 3.46 1.25 
F = 18.9162 
1-tailed p=  0.000 
AdJtinil 
Auditors with predominantly cotnpliancelased audit' 
experience (n=19) 
4.95 1.43 
Auditors with predominantly substantive based audit 
experience (n. -46) 
4.86 1.44 
Students (n=80) 3.46 1.25 
KW = 29.5231 
p =0.000 
Au  'tors with FL 	(n=24) 5.00 1.38 
Auditors without FL Experience (n=32) 4.78 1.45 
Students (n=80) 3.46 1.25 
KW = 294444 
p 	0.000 
Ntinribiiif Years of Et Experience t auditor subjects) (n=56) 7.33 5.41 
-0.945 
I -tailedrii= 0.185 
No. of Financial Institutions Audited (auditor subjects) (n=56) 
t = 4.525 
8.45 28.10 
14.ailed p = 0.067 
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The analysis of variance F test is used to compare the means of each pair of categories 
as a directional hypothesis is being considered. 40 The F test is appropriate for 
variance hypotheses if the population distribution is normal or the sample sizes are 
quite large. 4 ' The samples are also assumed to have been randomly selected from the 
population in an independent manner. The population is assumed to be normally 
distributed, with equal variances and means. However, moderate departures from 
these assumptions will not seriously affect the properties of the test. This is 
particularly true of the normality assumption. 42 
For H ta-1, the results are in line with the predicted relationship but the difference is not 
significant, thus indicating no experience effect, measured in terms of compliance and 
substantive based audit experience, on the level of accuracy of knowledge. As such, 
there is no support for H ia_i (F = 0.0449, 1-tailed p = 0.417). However, the results 
support the comparison between auditor and student subjects. The difference in the 
test scores between auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience 
— 
( x = 4.95) and students ( x = 3.46) are significant at the five percent level, thus 
supporting H ia_,; (F = 20.4162, 1-tailed p = 0.000). Similarly, the results also indicate 
significant differences between the test scores for the auditors with predominantly 
— 
substantive based audit experience (x = 4.86) and students (x = 3.46), thus 
supporting Hi a-iii (F statistics = 18.8519, 1-tailed p = 0.000) The Kruskal-Wallis test, 
which provided a comparison of more than two population distributions, also 
4() Hays (1963, p. 375). An analysis using the t test revealed the same conclusion as that obtained for 
the F test. 
41 ibid. p. 352. 
42 Mendenhall et al (1986, p. 422). 
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indicated that the three groups, auditors with predominantly compliance based audit 
experience, auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience and 
students, had significantly different test scores (KW = 29.5231, p = 0.000).43 Clearly, 
the result is driven by the student group's poor performance. 
To test whether there are knowledge differences between subject groups with and 
without financial institution experience, Hib, the subjects are classified into the 
following groups: 
1) auditors with financial institution audit experience, 
2) auditors without financial institution audit experience; and 
3) students without any practical experience. 
The computed mean test scores from Part One of the questionnaire for the financial 
institution auditors, non-financial institution auditors and students are 5.00, 4.78 and 
3.46 respectively. Although there is a slight difference between the mean score of the 
two types of auditors, the difference is not significant (F = 0.3237, 1-tailed p = 0.286). 
As such, in relation to 11 1b-19 the results indicated that there is no financial institution 
experience effect on the level of accuracy of knowledge. 
The mean test score for the financial institution auditors is significantly higher than 
the mean test score for the students at the 0.05 level (F = 26.5143, p = 0.000) and is 
consistent with Hlb-ii  . The mean test score for non-financial institution auditors is 
43 Mendahall et at (1986, p. 800). The Kruskal-Wallis test is a one way analysis of variance procedure 
based on ranked data and is the nonparametric counterpart to the completely randomized design. It is 
used when the sample observations do not satisfy the requirements of the F-test, like those involving 
ordinal data or when the probability distribution of observation is distinctly non-normal in appearance. 
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also significantly higher than the mean score for the students at the 0.05 level which 
supports H b-ill (F = 18.9162, 1-tailed p = 0.000). 
The Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that the mean test scores for the three groups, 
financial institution auditors, non-financial institution auditors and students, are 
significantly different at the five percent level of significance (KW = 29.4444, p = 
0.000). Clearly, this is again driven by differences between the students', internal 
control evaluation accuracy and the auditors' accuracy rather than financial institution 
audit experience. 
Further tests were conducted based on the following models: 
test score = a + P(FIEXP) + E 
test score = a + P(FI#) + E 
The results indicated no financial institution experience effect of the level of 
knowledge accuracy (t = -0.905, p = 0.185). The results also revealed that the number 
of financial institution audits conducted has no significant effect on the level of 
knowledge accuracy (t = -1.525, p = 0.067). 
LEVEL OF CONSENSUS BETWEEN SUBJECT GROUPS 
The level of consensus between subject groups relates to the level of agreement 
among subjects for the internal control evaluations provided by the subjects for the 
sixteen cases in Part Two of the questionnaire. 
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To measure the level of consensus, a correlation analysis is performed. The subjects 
are first separated into the respective analysis groups (high/low knowledge groups, 
compliance/substantive based audit experience groups or financial institution/non-
financial institution groups). Each subject's evaluations for the cases in Part Two of 
the questionnaire are correlated with the evaluations of each remaining subject in the 
group, using the Spearman Correlation. The Spearman Correlation is a measure of 
association between two variables which requires both variables be measured in at 
least an ordinal scale so that the objects or individuals under study may be ranked in 
two ordered series. 44 In this study, the internal control evaluations for the 16 cases of 
each subject can be ranked. The rankings of the cases for each subject can then be 
correlated with the rankings of each of the remaining 137 subjects to obtain the 
Spearman correlation coefficients. There are 137 Spearman correlation coefficients 
for each subject. A mean consensus is obtained for each subject and also for each 
subject group. The Mann-Whitney test is used to test whether the two independent 
groups were drawn from the same population. This test may be used when at least 
ordinal measurement has been achieved for the variables being studied. The mean 
consensus for each subject can be ranked and this test identifies any differences 
between the consensus levels of the two subject groups. A higher coefficient indicates 
a higher level of consensus within the respective group. Table 8 documents the mean 
correlation coefficients, the U values and the probability levels for each group. 
44 Siegel and CasteIlan (1988, p. 235). 
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Hypotheses Groups mean 	Standard 	 I-tailed p 
correlation Deviation 
TABLE 8 LEVEL OF CONSENSUS FOR EACH SUBJECT GROUP CLASSIFIED 
ACCORDING TO THE HYPOTHESES 
H2a : Knowledge effect on level of consensus 
- subjects with more than four correct 	0.66 	0.16 
answers (n = 51) 
- subjects with four or less correct 	0.61 	0.22 	1983 	0.133 
answers 
(n = 87) 
H2b : Compliance audit experience effect on level of consensus 
- Auditors with predominantly 	 0.68 	0.17 
compliance experience (n = 19) 
- Auditors with predominantly 	 0.67 	0.10 	229 	0.023 
substantive experience (n = 36) 
H2b-ii 	- Auditors with predominantly 	 0.68 	0.17 
compliance experience (n = 19) 
- Students (n = 80) 	 0.61 	0.23 	448.5 	0.003 
11 2A-111 	 - Auditors with predominantly 	 0.67 	0.10 
substantive experience (n = 36) 
- Students (n = 80) 	 0.61 	0.23 	1288.5 	0.183 
H2 : Financial institution audit experience effect on level of consensus 
- FT auditors (n = 24) 	 0.65 	0.18 
- NET auditors (n = 32) 0.69 	0.05 	360 	0.346 
- Fl auditors (n = 24) 	 0.65 	0.18 
- Students (n = 80) 0.61 	0.23 	739 	0.044 
- NFI auditors (n = 32) 	 0.69 	0.05 
- Students (n = 80) 0.61 	0.23 	1019 	0.046 
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To test whether there is a greater level of consensus amongst subjects with accurate 
internal control knowledge and those with less accurate internal control knowledge, 
H2a, the subjects are classified into the following groups: 
1) subjects with more than four correct answers in Part One of the questionnaire, and 
2) subjects with four or less correct answers in Part One of the questionnaire. 
The mean Spearman Correlation Coefficient for the high internal control knowledge 
group and low internal control knowledge group are 0.66 and 0.61 respectively. The 
difference is not significant at the 0.05 level indicating no knowledge effect on the 
level of consensus and thus, H2a is not supported (U = 1983, p = 0.133). 
To test whether compliance audit experience, regardless of industry, brings about a 
higher level of consensus, H2b, the statistical steps performed for H2 a are repeated to 
obtain a mean Spearman Correlation Coefficient for each of the following groups: 
1) auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience, 
2) auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience; and 
3) students with no practical audit experience. 
The coefficients are 0.68, 0.67 and 0.61 for the auditors with predominantly 
compliance based audit experience, the auditors with predominantly substantive based 
audit experience and students with no practical audit experience respectively. The 
difference is significant at the five percent level between the level of consensus for: 
1) auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience (U = 229, 1-tailed p = 0.023); 
and 
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2) auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and students with 
no practical audit experience (U = 448.5, 1-tailed p = 0.003). 
The difference is not significant for level of consensus of the auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience and the students with no practical 
audit experience (U = 1288.5, 1-tailed p = 0.183). The results support H2b_ 1  and H2b_11 
but not H2b-iii• This indicates a extensive audit experience effect on the level of 
consensus of the subjects. As such, compliance based audit experience is associated 
with better performance of the auditors as indicated by the level of consensus. 
In relation to H2c-1, the consensus levels are not in the predicted direction for the 
auditors with financial institution experience (0.65) and without financial institution 
experience (0.69). A possible reason for a reverse relationship in the level of 
consensus is the specialised nature of the industry. The transactions of the financial 
institution are specific to this industry and are extremely complex. In auditing this 
industry, auditors would acquire specific knowledge of the financial instruments and 
may be unable to relegate from a specific level of knowledge to a general level. In 
relation to internal control, the auditors of financial institutions have more exposure to 
compliance testing but the specific nature of the compliance testing does not 
necessarily allow these auditors to apply the acquired "specific" internal control 
knowledge to a general internal control context, such as in a payroll cycle or revenue 
cycle. 45 
45 Russell S., Derivative Failures and Internal Controls : What Lessons Can Auditors Learn?, Auditors 
& Liquidators Trust Fund Lecture, 10 October 1996. 
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Nevertheless, the levels of consensus for both financial institution and non-financial 
institution auditors, 0.65 and 0.69, are relatively higher than the level of consensus for 
the students (0.61). The results provide support for both H2 c _ 1 (financial institution 
auditor versus students) and H2c. 11; (non-financial institution auditor versus students). 
LEVEL OF SELF INSIGHT WITHIN SUBJECT GROUPS 
The level of self insight is measured by correlating the subject's objective and 
subjective perception of the importance of the five cues used in Part Two and Part 
Three of the questionnaire respectively. The subjective perception is provided by the 
subjects in Part Three of the questionnaire where they are required to assign weights 
to the five cues according to their belief about the level of reliance they place on those 
cues when evaluating the strength of the internal control structure. The objective 
perception for each subject is obtained through the internal control evaluation 
performed by the subjects in Part Two of the questionnaire and is computed as 
follows: 
1) The descriptive ANOVA or the objective perception of the importance of each of 
the five cues is derived using the F-ratio for the five main effects of the cues. 
Each cue constitutes a main effect. The five cues are repetitive across the sixteen 
cases which have been pre-answered, Yes or No. A "1" is allocated to a "Yes" 
cue and a "0" for a "No" cue. As such, for Case One which has been pre-
answered "Yes" for all the cues, five ones are allocated, one for each cue. For 
Case Two whereby the five cues have been pre-answered "YES", "YES", "YES", 
"NO" and "NO", three "1" and two "0" are allocated. The two cases are provided 
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in Figure 5. The remaining fourteen cases are similarly modeled for each subject. 
This technique of analysis was developed by Hoffman, Slovic and Rorer (1968) 
and was utilised in Ashton (1974), Ashton and Brown (1980) and Ashton and 
Kramer (1980). 
The internal control evaluation indicated by the subject will vary from 1, 
weakest, to 7, strongest, depending on the subjects' judgement based on the five 
internal control cues. For each subject, the following data, in relation to the 
sixteen cases, are used to analyse via the ANOVA, the systematic responses to 
patterns of answers. For example, the sixteen evaluations for the sixteen cases 
and the "0" or "1" allocation of the five cues for the sixteen cases in relation to 
Subject One are as follows: 
Descriptive ANOVA for Subject One 
Cases I/C 
Strength 
Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4 Cue 5 
Case 1 7 1 1 1 1 1 
Case 2 5 1 1 1 0 0 
Case 3 6 1 1 0 1 0 
Case 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 
Case 5 4 1 0 1 1 0 
Case 6 3 1 0 1 0 1 
Case 7 4 1 0 0 1 1 
Case 8 4 0 1 1 1 0 
Case 9 3 0 1 1 0 1 
Case 10 4 0 1 0 1 1 
Case 11 2 0 0 1 1 1 
Case 12 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Case 13 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Case 14 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Case 15 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Case 16 1 0 0 0 0 1 
1/0 for cues - 1 for a cue pre-answered "Yes" and 0 for a cue pre-answered "No" 
I/C Strength - 1 for weakest to 7 for strongest 
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FIGURE 5 EXAMPLES OF CASES IN PART THREE OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
CASE NO. 1 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 7 
CASE NO. 2 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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1. Cont'd 
The internal control evaluation for each of the sixteen cases is dependent upon the 
five cues provided. Each cue, cue 1 to cue 5, is a main effect on the dependent 
variable and therefore, there are five main effects." 
No interaction effect is investigated as the results of prior research (Ashton and 
Kramer, 1980, p. 6) have indicated that there are no significant interaction effects. 
The interaction effect in Ashton (1974) were insignificant and Ashton and Brown 
(1980, p. 272) contended that interactions were quite unimportant in terms of 
explaining the variance in the auditor's judgements, even though eighty four 
interactions were estimated for each auditor. The investigation of multiple 
interaction is also limited by the degrees of freedom in the models for individual 
subjects. 
However, it is acknowledged that the lack of significant interactions found in this 
and prior studies requires further investigation. Auditors undergo a lengthy audit 
from planning, tests of controls, substantive testing to analytical reviews at 
different points in time. The auditors are always receiving information about the 
46 Internal control strength = f [Cue 1 + Cue 2 + Cue 3 + Cue 4 + Cue 5 + (Cue I *Cue2) + (Cue 
l*Cue 3) + (Cue I *Cue 4) + (Cue I *Cue 5) + (Cue 2*Cue 3) + (Cue 2*Cue 4) + (Cue 2*Cue 5) +(Cue 
3*Cue 4) + (Cue 3*Cue 5) + (Cue 4*Cue 5) + (Cue l*Cue 2*Cue 3) + (Cue l*Cue 2*Cue 4) + (Cue 
I *Cue 2*Cue 5) + (Cue 2*Cue 3*Cue 4) + (Cue 2*Cue 3*Cue 5) + (Cue 3*Cue 4*Cue 5) + (Cue 
l*Cue 2*Cue 3*Cue 4) + (Cue I *Cue 2*Cue 3*Cue 5) + (Cue 2*Cue 3*Cue 4*Cue 5) + (Cue l*Cue 
2*Cue 3*Cue 4*Cue 5)]. The main effects are highlighted in bold. 
80 
1. Cont'd 
clients. Their judgements are expected to be based on a whole range of 
information and not simply based on one piece of information. Therefore, the 
question of why the auditors in this internal control task did not frequently rely on 
interactions between pieces of information is an interesting question that may be 
interesting to investigate in a later study. 
2) For each subject, the omega squared, co 2 for each main effect or each cue, is 
computed based on the ANOVA in (1) and is used to quantify the proportion of 
variance in judgement attributable to each cue. 47 The co2 indicates the cue 
utilisation pattern for each subject. The co2 measures the extent to which each 
auditor utilised each of the five internal control cues/questions in formulating the 
internal control judgements. 48 Based on the internal control evaluations provided 
by Subject One, the 0)2 for each main effect obtained and the point allocation from 
the questionnaire, is presented in Table 9. The point allocation indicates the 
objective perception of the subject in relation to the level of reliance on each of 
the five cues present in the sixteen cases when evaluating the internal control 
strength. Table 10 documents the 138 subjects' objective judgement model, co 2 . 
47 Hay (1963, p. 325) 
48 Ashton (1974, p. 151) 
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TABLE 9 CORRELATION BETWEEN THE CO2 AND POINT ALLOCATION OF 
SUBJECT ONE 
Cues CO2 Pt Allocation 
Cue 1 .289 30.00 
Cue 2 .373 35.00 
Cue 3 .027 10.00 
Cue 4 .216 20.00 
Cue 5 .006 5.00 
Self insight index = 0.9878 
CO2 - omega squared computed for Subject one 
Pt Allocation - point allocation provided by Subject One in Part Three of the questionnaire 
Self insight index - correlation between co2 and the point allocation 
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3. The co2 and Point Allocation are then correlated to obtain the self insight index for 
the subject. For Subject One, the self insight index is 0.9878, as reported in Table 
9 previously, indicating a high level of correlation between the objective 
perception, co2 , and subjective perception, point allocation. The above procedure 
is repeated for all subjects to obtain a self insight index for each individual subject 
using the Pearson Correlation. The Pearson correlation is computed on the 
average ranks due to the large numbers of ties that occurred. 49 Table 11 
documents the results for the level of self insight in relation to the various subject 
groups. 
49  Ashton and Kramer (1980, P.  10). The responses from the subjects in this thesis support this 
statement as subjects consistently evaluated more than one case on the same strength or weakness. In 
other words, for each subject, there were numerous cases whereby the subject has selected the same 
internal control strength. Taking Subject One as an example, 3 cases are evaluated as "extremely 
weak", 3 as "very weak", 2 as "substantial weakness", 5 as "some weakness", 1 as "marginally 
adequate", 1 as "adequate" and 1 as "strong". 
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TABLE 11 LEVEL OF SELF INSIGHT FOR EACH GROUP CLASSIFIED 
ACCORDING TO EACH HYPOTHESIS 
H : ,,, . Krim\ ledge effect on the level of self insight 
H 3„ 	- subjects with more than four correct an_swers (n=51) 	0.76 
- subjects with four or less correct answers (n=87) 0.74 
U= 1926.5 
1-telli 	0.192  
: Complianceiuditerperience effect on the level of It iniht 
11.m . ; 	Auditors with predominantly compliance experience 	0.84 
(n=19) 
Auditors with predominantly substantive experience 	0.80 
(n=36) 
= 2,84 
1-tailed p = 0.232 
Auditors with predominantly compliance experience 	0.84 
(n=19) 
Students (n=80) 	 0.70 
U = 489 
1 -tailed p = 0.023 
Auditors with predominantly substantive experience 	0.80 
(n=36) 
Students (n=80) 	 0.70 
U = 1131 
1- eitaio = 
H3c-i 
113c-id 
F inancial inqitution_audit evericnce effect on the leN,e1 ci elt' in,icht 
Auditors with FI Experience n=24) 
Auditors without F1 Experience n=32) 
U = 365 
1-tailedp = 0.478 
Auditors with FI Experience (n=24) 
Students (n=80) 
U = 671 
1 -tailed p = 0.034 
Auditors without FI Experience (n=3 ) 
Students (n=80) 
U = 979 
0.82 
0.81 
0.82 
0.70 
0.81 
0.70 
Additional te: 
A uditors with predominantly compliance experience 	0.84 
(n=1_9) 
Auditors with predominantly substantive experience 	0.80 
(n=36) 
Students (4F.;80) 	 0.70 
KW '45.5.313 
1 - tailed p = 0.032  
Auditors with El Experience (n=24) 	 0.82 
Auditors without Fl Experience n=32) 0.81 
Students (n=80) 	 0.70 
Klit`=5.1392 
1-tailed p = 0.038 
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To test whether a more accurate level of knowledge resulted in a higher level of self 
insight, H3a, the subjects are classified into the following groups: 
1) subjects with more than four correct answers in Part One of the questionnaire, and 
2) subjects with four or less correct answers in Part One of the questionnaire. 
For each group, a mean self insight index is obtained and the mean indices for the two 
groups are then compared using the Mann Whitney U test. The Mann-Whitney U test 
allows for testing group differences when the populations are not normally distributed 
or when it cannot be assumed that the samples are from populations that are equal in 
variability. 50  i It s an alternative to the t-test for two independent samples. 
The self insight indices, obtained through Pearson Correlation, were quite high for 
both the high and low internal control knowledge groups, being 0.76 and 0.74 
respectively. While they were marginally higher for the high knowledge group, the 
difference is not significant and thus there is no statistical support for H3 a (U = 
1926.5, p = 0.192). 
The self insight indices are 0.84 and 0.80 for the auditors with compliance based audit 
experience and the auditors with substantive based audit experience respectively. The 
indices for the two auditor groups are not significantly different at five percent level. 
Thus, the results render no support for H3b-,  (U = 284, p = 0.232). This indicates that 
there is no experience effect, as measured by compliance based audit experience, on 
the level of self-insight. The self insight index for the auditors with predominantly 
5() Z i km u nd (1994, p. 539). 
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compliance based audit experience (0.84) is significantly higher (U = 489, p = 0.023) 
than the students' (0.70). Similarly, the index for the auditors with predominantly 
substantive based audit experience (0.80) is also significantly higher (U = 1131, p = 
0.048) than the students' (0.70). This renders support for both H3b-li and 
indicating a compliance and substantive audit experience effect on the level of self 
insight for auditors versus students.. 
As is to be expected, the Kruskal-Wallis test also indicates that the three groups, 
auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience, auditors with 
predominantly substantive audit experience and students, have significantly different 
self insight indices (KW = 5.5313, p = 0.032). 
Similarly, the self insight indices are not significantly different at 0.82 and 0.81 for the 
financial institution and non-financial institution auditors respectively indicating no 
experience effect and thus, H31 is not supported (U = 365, p = 0.478). 
Comparing the mean self insight indices for financial institution auditors (0.82) and 
students (0.70), there appears to be a significant experience effect on the level of self 
insight which rendered support for H3c _ 1  (U = 671, p = 0.034). For non-financial 
auditors and students, the self insight indices, being 0.81 and 0.70 are significantly 
different (U = 979, p = 0.038). As such, H3c-111 is supported. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
also indicates that the three groups, financial institution auditors, non-financial 
institution auditors and students, have significantly different self insight indices (KW 
= 5.1392, p = 0.038), a result driven by the difference between students and auditors. 
A further analysis based on the number of years of financial institution experience 
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indicates that there is no experience impact on the level of self insight at the 0.05 level 
of significance (t = -0.703, p = 0.243). 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
As a limited additional test for consensus, the (0 2 for each of the five main effects is 
correlated to obtain a correlation coefficient for each subject pair. This assists in 
identifying pairs of subjects with highly and lowly correlated co 2 . 
The descriptive ANOVAs, i.e. objective judgement models, for eight subject pairs are 
reported in Table 12. The co2 for the five cues of each subject is correlated with the 0o2 
of each of the remaining one hundred and thirty eight subjects. Table 12 details two 
groups of paired subjects, four pairs of subjects with highly correlated co 2 and four 
pairs of subjects with lowly correlated 0. From the correlation coefficients in Table 
12, Panel A and B respectively, it is noted that subject pairs comprising subjects 35 
and 85, 16 and 29, 13 and 26, and; 50 and 57 have relatively high correlation 
coefficients; while subject pairs comprising subjects 59 and 116, 78 and 126, 18 and 
52, and; 66 and 69 have relatively low correlation coefficients. 
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TABLE 12 (02 OF SUBJECTS WITH A HIGH/LOW CORRELATION COEFFICIENT 
(THE CORRELATION COEFFICIENT IS COMPUTED BY CORRELATING THE 
FIVE CO2 OF A PAIR OF SUBJECTS) 
Panel A : Subjects With Highly Correlated co 2 
subject subject subject subject subject subject subject subject 
35 85 16 29 13 26 50 57 
Cue 1 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.46 0.51 0.39 0.30 
Cue 2 0.21 0.20 0.41 0.38 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.23 
Cue 3 0.08 0.08 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
Cue 4 0.14 0.13 0.03 0.03 0101 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Cue 5 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Pearson 
Correlation 0.9998 0.9998 0.9991 0.9971 
Panel B : Subjects with Lowly Correlated co2 
subject subject subject subject subject subject subject subject 
59 116 78 126 18 52 66 69 
Cue 1 0.37 0.12 0.30 0.04 0.46 0.02 0.12 0.07 
Cue 2 0.20 0.17 0.40 0.07 0.14 0.005 -0.04 0.49 
Cue 3 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.03 
Cue 4 0.01 0.30 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.40 -0.04 0.31 
Cue 5 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.07 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.7590 -0.7431 -0.7117 -0.7147 
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With respect to compliance/substantive experience, all the auditor subjects in the low 
correlation group (subjects 18 and 126) and the high correlation group (subjects 13, 
16, 26, 29 and 35) have predominantly substantive audit experience The remaining 
subjects are students. Furthermore, six of the eight subjects in the low correlation 
group were in the low knowledge category (subjects 18, 59, 66, 78 and 116) while 
only three of the eight subjects in the high correlation group were in the low 
knowledge category (subjects 50, 57 and 85). Based on the current analysis of the 16 
subjects, it could be interpreted that compliance experience may not have an effect on 
the level of consensus but the level of knowledge accuracy may have an effect on the 
level of consensus. 
For the group with low correlation coefficients, one is a financial institution auditor 
(subject 126), one is a non-financial institution auditor (subject 18) while the rest are 
students (subjects 52, 59, 66, 69, 78 and 116). On the other hand, for the group with 
high correlation coefficients, five of the eight are non-financial institution auditors 
(subjects 13, 16, 26, 29 and 35) while the remaining three are students (subject 50, 57 
and 85). This analysis indicates that non-financial institution auditors may possess 
more expertise in internal control evaluation compared to financial institution auditors 
and students, which may result in higher levels of consensus. 
However, it should be noted that the conclusions above are limited to the number of 
subjects included in the analysis. 51 A complete analysis encompassing all 138 
51 
To prevent any distortion in the analysis, unmotivated subjects have not been included. Unmotivated 
subjects are subjects who did not complete the questionnaire with adequate effort, thus affecting the 
generalisability of the results. Examples include subjects who did not fully complete the demographics 
section of the questionnaire. For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of unmotivated subjects, 
refer to Chapter 7, section on limitations. 
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subjects is beyond the scope of this thesis. Future research could investigate 
differences or similarities of the individual subjects' objective utilisation of the cues. 
Additional tests were conducted to examine recency effects. The levels of knowledge 
accuracy, consensus and self insight were correlated with the number of months since 
the last financial institution was audited. The results are positive correlations 
indicating a reversed recency effect. This effect is significant only for knowledge 
accuracy, however. The correlation coefficients are as follows: 
1) 0.354 (1-tailed p = 0.000) for the correlation between the number of months since 
the last financial institution audit and knowledge accuracy; 
2) 0.1219 (1-tailed p = 0.116) for the correlation between the number of months 
since the last financial institution audit and the level of consensus in internal 
control evaluations; and 
3) 0.2722 (1-tailed p = 0.074) for the correlation between the number of months 
since the last financial institution audit and the level of self insight in internal 
control evaluations. 
As previous results in this study did not provide support for the financial institution 
experience effect, it was unlikely that a recency effect based on financial institution 
experience would be supported. Furthermore, the results are consistent with Trotman 
and Wright (1996) where the results indicated no recency effect for students, seniors 
or managers in the performance of the internal control task. The lack of recency 
effects could be attributable to task differences in that detailed compliance work is 
usually performed by auditors at the junior level while senior auditors are responsible 
for reviewing the work performed by the junior auditors. According to Bonner 
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(1990), the knowledge required to perform the task may be gained early in an 
auditor's career and decay over time. In this study, only one of the twenty four 
financial institution auditors has less than three years audit experience. As such, the 
senior auditors in this study may have less accurate knowledge to work with in the 
first instance. Further research could investigate recency effects using subjects 
comprising more junior auditors and/or based on the timing of the last compliance 
based audit. The results in this study indicated an experience effect, in terms of 
compliance based audit experience, on the level of consensus which could provide 
further support for a recency effect based on compliance based audit experience. 
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SUMMARY 
Table 13 summarises the results of the hypotheses testing. The results support twelve 
of the twenty hypotheses. Results are mixed for the three sets of hypotheses, the 
accuracy hypotheses, self insight hypotheses and the consensus hypotheses. 
In relation to the knowledge accuracy hypotheses, there are knowledge differences in 
the predicted direction for the following groups: 
1. auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and students, 
2. auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience and students, 
3. financial institution auditors and students; and 
4. non-financial institution auditors and students. 
However, there are no knowledge differences between: 
1. auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience; and 
2. financial institution auditors and non-financial institution auditors. 
There is support for the consensus hypotheses in relation to the following groups: 
1. auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience, 
2. auditor with predominantly compliance based audit experience and students, 
3. financial institution auditors and students; and 
4. non-financial institution auditors and students. 
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p = 0.417 	No compliance audit experience effect on knowledge 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.000 	Experience effect on knowledge 
(auditors with predominantly compliance based experience 
versus students) 
p = 0.000 	Experience effect on knowledge 
(auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience 
versus students) 
p = 0.286 	No financial institution experience effect (financial institution 
auditors versus non-financial institution auditors) on knowledge 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.000 	Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) 
on knowledge 
p = 0.000 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus 
students) on knowledge 
TABLE 13 SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Hypotheses Results 	Conclusion 
H 1 : Accuracy of internal control evaluations increases as knowledge/extensive audit experience 
increases 
Hia_i 
Hla-ii 
H2: COIPA`MLIS on internal control evaluations increases as knowledge/extensive audit experience 
int reases  
11 2„ 	 p = 0.133 	No knowledge effect on consensus 
(In predicted direction) 
II 	 p = 0.023 	Compliance experience effect on consensus 
p = 0.003 	Experience effect . (auditors with predominantly compliance 
based experience versus students) on consensus 
p = 0.183 	No experience effect (auditors with predominantly substantive 
based experience versus students) on consensus 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.346 	No experience effect (financial institution auditors versus non- 
financial institution auditors) on consensus 
(Not in predicted direction) 
p = 0.044 	Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) 
on consensus 
p = 0.046 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus 
students) on consensus 
: Sell insight improves with increasing knowledge/extensive audit experience 
p = 0.192 	No knowledge effect on level of self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
H3tr-i 	 p = 0.232 	No compliance based experience effect (compliance versus 
substantive) on the level of self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.023 	Experience effect (auditors with predominantly compliance 
based experience versus students) on the level of self-insight 
p = 0.048 
	
	Experience effect (auditors with predominantly substantive based 
experience versus students) on the level of self-insight 
p = 0.478 	No financial institution experience effect (financial institution 
auditors versus non-financial institution auditors) on the level of 
self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
113-c-11 	 p = 0.034 	Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) 
on level of self-insight 
p = 0.038 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus 
students) on level of self-insight  
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The results were insignificant for the consensus hypothesis in relation to the high 
knowledge group versus low knowledge group category, the financial institution 
auditors versus non-financial institution auditors; and the auditor with predominantly 
substantive audit experience versus students group. 
The results for the self insight hypotheses rendered support for the following groups: 
1. auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and students; 
2. auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience and students; 
3. financial institution auditors and students; and 
4. non-financial institution auditors and students. 
However, the results do not support the hypotheses in relation to the following groups: 
1. high knowledge group and low knowledge group; 
2. auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience; and 
3. financial institution auditors and non-financial institution auditors. 
In general, there seems to be limited support for the compliance experience 
hypotheses. There is a compliance experience effect on the level of consensus but 
none on knowledge and the level of self insight (see Table 14, Panel A). There is no 
support for the extensive audit experience hypotheses as measured by financial 
institution audit experience versus non-financial institution audit experience (see 
Table 14, Panel D). The results provide some support for the auditors with 
predominantly substantive based experience versus students hypotheses (see Table 14, 
Panel C) and full support for the following: 
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1. auditors with predominantly compliance based experience versus students 
hypotheses (see Table 14, Panel B), 
2. financial institution auditor versus students hypotheses (see Table 14, Panel E); 
and 
3. non-financial institution auditor versus students hypotheses (see Table 14, Panel 
F). 
Furthermore, there is also no knowledge effect on the level of consensus or the level 
of self insight (see Table 15, Panel G). 
In view of the above discussion, compliance based audit experience may be a useful 
factor in training an auditor to become an expert in internal control evaluations, as 
evidenced by the significant differences in the level of consensus between auditors 
with predominantly compliance based audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive based audit experience. Furthermore, it is clear that some 
experience as opposed to no experience plays a key role in the accumulation of 
knowledge and performance of internal control evaluations. Hence, students do not 
perform as well as any of the auditor group in terms of accuracy, consensus or self 
insight. 
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Panel G: Knowled e H .otheses 
Results dif 'Rh ptittses conclusio 
TABLE 14 RESULTS FOR THE TWELVE EXTENSIVE AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
HYPOTHESES 
„ II 
Panel A : Corn liance Ex .erience II .otheses 
Results Conclusion 
	
fito-+ 	 = 0.417 	No compliance audit experience effect on knowledge 
(In predicted direction) 
, 111.24-i 	 p = 0.023 	Compliance experience effect on consensus 
H31,1 	 = 0.232 No compliance experience effect (compliance versus substantive) on the level of 
self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
Pantl It 1 	c rience H .otheses (Com liance based audit ex .erience versus students) 
Results 	41:4 	Conclusion 
111,Ji p = 0.000 Experience effect on knowledge 
(auditors with predominantly compliance based experience versus students) 
p = 0.003 	Experience effect (auditors with predominantly compliance based experience 
versus students) on consensus 
11.14.0 p = 0.023 	Experience effect (auditors with predominantly compliance based experience 
versus students) on the level of self-insight 
 
Panel C : Ex erience Hy .otheses (Substantive based audit ex .erience versus students) 
jr oth 
	
FResults 	 conclusion 
p = 0.000 	Experience effect on knowledge 
(auditors with predominantly substantive based audit experience versus 
students) 
p = 0.183 	No experience effect (auditors with predominantly substantive based experience 
versus students) on consensus 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.048 	Experience effect (auditors with predominantly substantive based experience 
versus students) on the level of self-insight  
Panel D: Financial Institution Ex .erience H .otheses 
Slypotlifses 	IYIJ.esult 	 onclusio 
p = 0.286 	No financial institution experience effect (financial institution auditors versus 
non-financial institution auditors) on knowledge 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.346 	No experience effect (financial institution auditors versus non-financial 
institution auditors) on consensus 
(Not in predicted direction) 
p = 0.478 	No financial institution experience effect (financial institution auditors versus 
non-financial institution auditors) on the level of self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
Panel E I Ind n( I.11 Institution Ex erience H .otheses (Financial Institution Auditors Versus Students) 
ypeaganiN Results 	 Conclusion 
jHt 	 p = 0.000 	Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) on knowledge 
p = 0.044 Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) on consensus 
p = 0.034 	Experience effect (financial institution auditors versus students) on level of self- 
insight  
Panel F : Non-Financial Institution Ex .erience H .otheses (Non-financial institution Auditors Versus Students) 
• ()theses 	hakeults 	 Conclusioni 
p =0.000 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus students) on 
knowledge 
p = 0.046 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus students) on 
consensus 
p = 0.038 	Experience effect (non-financial institution auditors versus students) on level of 
self-insight 
p = 0.133 
	
No knowledge effect on consensus 
(In predicted direction) 
p = 0.192 
	
No knowledge effect on level of self-insight 
(In predicted direction) 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
RESULTS 
Most prior research into auditor expertise begins by designating groups of experts and 
novices on the basis of general or task-specific experience; it then compares subject 
groups with respect to performance and/or cognitive dimensions such as knowledge 
contact or knowledge organisation (Bonner and Lewis 1991, p. 16). This study 
departs from the conventional approaches by classifying novices and experts based 
on: 
1) knowledge level (high or low knowledge level), and 
2) two measures of extensive internal control audit experience 
• compliance/substantive based audit experience 
• financial institution/non-financial institution (FUNFI) experience) 
The results of this study show that the level of accuracy is not significantly affected by 
compliance based audit experience or financial institution audit experience. The level 
of consensus seems to be affected by the level of knowledge and the extensive internal 
control audit experience proxy, compliance based audit experience but not financial 
institution experience. There is no significant knowledge or extensive audit 
experience effect on the level of self insight. However, there is clear indication that 
significant differences exist between students and auditors in relation to knowledge, 
consensus and self insight levels. 
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The results indicate that the subjects with more extensive experience do not possess a 
higher level of knowledge. In other words, the level of knowledge does not differ 
between auditors with predominantly compliance audit experience and auditors with 
predominantly substantive audit experience. Neither does the level of knowledge 
differ for auditors with or without financial institution experience. However, when 
comparing the test scores for auditors and students, it makes a difference whether the 
subject has some or no audit experience. 
A higher level of knowledge is not significantly associated with better performance in 
relation to the consensus measure or the self insight measure, although the results are 
in the predicted direction. 
When experience is measured in terms of compliance based audit experience, the 
more experienced subjects exhibit better performance in terms of the level of 
consensus but not the level of self insight. It should be noted that not only is there a 
difference in the level of knowledge accuracy, there is also a noticeable difference in 
the level of consensus between auditors and students. This indicates that some 
experience compared to no experience is important in attaining a higher level of 
consensus. These results also indicate that "performance" is multi-faceted in that 
subjects do not attain high levels of knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight 
concurrently. Further research in relation to expertise should explore all aspects of 
performance measures and investigate the specific variables affecting each 
performance measure. 
99 
Subjects with financial institution experience do not display a higher level of 
consensus or self insight. As previously mentioned, this could be due to the 
specialised nature of the industry. Although these auditors are more exposed to 
compliance testing, the specific nature of the compliance testing does not necessarily 
allow these auditors to apply the acquired "specific" internal control knowledge to a 
general internal control context such as payroll. 
Furthermore, the internal control reporting requirement for financial institution clients 
may not be very different from the documentation of the compliance testing in the 
audit working papers and the management report for the non-financial institution 
clients. The amount of time and investigation devoted to the review of the internal 
control structure may not differ significantly between financial institution audits and 
non-financial institution audits. 
As a result of the two reasons stated above, the level of knowledge, consensus and self 
insight may not differ significantly between financial institution auditors and non-
financial institution auditors. Nevertheless, the students display a lower level of 
consensus and self insight compared to both the financial institution and non-financial 
institution auditors. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF RESULT 
The results in this study generally support the results from several prior studies of 
judgement differences between students and auditors, whereby there were differences 
in the levels of knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight between students and 
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experienced auditors. 52 According to Ashton and Kramer (1980, p. 12), students may 
be good surrogates if the purpose of the research is for the general improvement of 
human judgement but not for research aiming to improve decision making on specific 
tasks. Nevertheless, Ashton and Kramer (1980, p. 12) recommended that: 
"where feasible, future behavioural accounting research projects might include 
student subjects ... in order to evaluate the importance of experience, wealth, 
age or other factors to the issue under investigation ... When the responses of the 
two groups differ substantially, one or more of these factors are important". 
The results in this study clearly indicated that there are significant differences between 
students and auditors in relation to the levels of knowledge accuracy, consensus and 
self insight of internal control evaluation. Therefore, having some experience as 
opposed to having no experience created differences in the knowledge and 
performance on internal control evaluation. 
According to Bonner and Lewis (1991, p. 18), performance is probably affected by 
knowledge organisation, strategies and motivation. Bonner and Lewis (1990) also 
emphasized that future research must delineate expertise on the basis of very specific 
training, experience and ability variables or proxies for those variables in the form of 
52 Ashton (1974) found significant differences (p = 0.04) in the levels of consensus between the more 
experienced (0.68) and less experienced subject groups (0.72) but in the wrong direction. Ashton and 
Brown (1980) found differences in the levels of consensus between the more experienced auditors and 
the less experienced auditors. Hamilton and Wright (1982) found that the more experienced subjects 
obtained a higher level of self insight. Both Bonner and Lewis (1990) and Libby and Tan (1994) found 
that there was a general experience effect on the performance of internal control evaluations. 
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knowledge or aptitude test scores. The results of this study provide support for this 
statement. Prior studies generally measure internal control expertise in terms of the 
positions held at firms and the total number of years of audit experience. This study 
extends the experience measures from experience to knowledge level. Furthermore, 
in addition to general audit experience, compliance based audit experience is an 
additional proxy for expertise in internal control evaluation. 
The results also have several implications for audit practice. First, since there are no 
differences in the level of knowledge, consensus and self insight between financial 
and non-financial institution auditors; financial institution audit experience is not a 
good proxy for internal control expertise. On the other hand, auditors with 
compliance based audit experience exhibited higher levels of consensus. It may be 
appropriate to train auditors in internal control evaluation by sending them to audit 
clients in the general industry but with an emphasis on internal control. Specialised 
industry experience such as the insurance companies and financial institutions may 
require more extensive internal control evaluations but due to the specialised nature of 
the industry, auditors may acquire the requisite knowledge and skills in evaluating 
internal control structures of that particular industry which does not transfer to general 
industry. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that decision aids be used to improve training or to 
replace human decision making. 53 It is crucial in the development of the decision aid 
that appropriate experts are identified in modeling the audit judgements. In relation to 
53 Ashton and Brown (1980, p. 276) 
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the internal control evaluation task, the potential benefits to be realised by judgement 
modeling should be greater if more experienced auditors are modeled such as the 
auditors with predominantly compliance based audit experience. Judgements include 
the preliminary assessment of control risk to determine the extent of compliance 
testing and also the final assessment of control risk to determine the reliability of the 
internal control structure. 
LIMITATIONS 
Several possible limitations of this research exist in relation to the use of 
questionnaires. First, due to the limitation of the sample size, random sampling error 
could occur. Furthermore, the response rate was 28.5%, so the remaining 71.5% of 
auditors who did not respond would have contributed to the non-response error. 
There is no way on which non-response bias can be tested since the identities of 
respondents/non-respondents are unknown. 
Second, unlike research exercises where subjects are financially rewarded for their 
participation in the questionnaire, the questionnaire was completed by the practising 
subjects at a time convenient to them. There is a lack of control over the 
circumstances under which the questionnaire was completed and the level of 
commitment in completing the questionnaire, although the subjects were instructed by 
the partner-in-charge to work individually and to take the questionnaire seriously. 
There were disguised questions in the questionnaires to identify subjects who have not 
completed the questionnaire with adequate effort. 
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The first case in Part Two of the questionnaire consisted of five cues, all of which 
have been pre-answered "Yes". Logically, the internal control structure should be 
evaluated as the strongest since there are no flaws in the system based on the cues 
provided. As such, a subject who evaluated the case other than "strong" would be 
identified as an unmotivated subject who had not given much thought to the 
questionnaire (n = 18). Furthermore, Part Three of the questionnaire required the 
subjects to allocate 100 points over the five cues to indicate the relative importance of 
each cue. Motivated subjects would have carefully allocated the 100 points 
accordingly and would have ensured that the points added up to 100. Subjects who 
did not ensure the additivity to 100 would be identified as unmotivated subjects (n = 
5). The last part of the questionnaire comprised of demographics details provided by 
the subjects and unmotivated subjects are presumably those who failed to complete 
the section (n = 7). 
The final group of subjects fulfilling the criteria of motivated subjects who undertook 
the questionnaire seriously totaled 101. Five subjects did not ensure that the point 
allocation in Part Three of the questionnaire added up to 100. Eighteen other subjects 
did not evaluate the internal control strength for case 1 as 7, strong or did not 
complete the sixteen cases in Part Two of the questionnaire in determining the internal 
control strength. did not complete the demographic details. Seven subjects failed to 
complete the demographic section, evaluate case 1 as strong (7) and/or ensure that the 
point allocation added up to 100. When the same analysis for the twenty hypotheses 
is conducted using the reduced number of subjects due to the elimination of the 
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unmotivated subjects, the results do not change significantly and the conclusions 
remain unchanged. 
Third, the use of questionnaires with simplified case scenarios may restrict the 
generalisability of results. Other factors compensating for the lack of internal controls 
would have been considered in the performance of an actual audit task. It is 
acknowledged that realism in the study is a limiting factor but this limitation is 
overcome by the motivation level in the subjects. The internal validity/external 
validity trade-off is common to most research studies involving responses from 
auditors. 
Fourth, the use of auditors from only one firm; and students from one tertiary 
institution has the potential of reducing the generalisability of the results as auditors 
from other firms and students from other institutions may possess different 
characteristics than the subjects studies here. However, auditors from all Big Six 
firms go through the same Professional Year program and differences should not be 
significant. Furthermore, the student subjects are from a reputable and established 
tertiary institution whose graduates are sometimes employed by the Big six accounting 
firm supplying the auditor subjects for this study. As such, there is no reason to 
expect the student subjects to perform differently from students in other institutions. 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study suggests the following research possibilities for future research. First, the 
study can be extended to investigate firm effects as different accounting firms have 
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different emphasis on audit procedures and different weights on required internal 
controls. 54 
Second, client effect can also be investigated. Different clients present different 
challenges to the auditors. Different business, internal control and structural 
environment other than financial institution/non-financial institution differences can 
provide the auditors with different forms of training. The difference in experience 
may result in differences in knowledge and performance levels. 
Third, although the results indicate that there is no financial institution audit 
experience effect on knowledge and performance, other specific experience variables 
can be used. Public sector audit experience emphasizes internal control evaluations 
and since the nature of operations is less specific than for financial institutions, there 
can well be a possible experience effect if this variable is used. The question that has 
yet to be answered is whether the same results would be yielded for other industries 
which are general in nature but have an emphasis on internal control evaluation. 
Furthermore, would the financial institution auditors attain a higher level of 
performance if the task was modeled in the context of financial institutions? 
Fourth, according to Ashton (1985, p. 185), if an individual's predictions agree 
strongly with those of others in a group, then that individual will tend to be among the 
most accurate in the group. This study can be extended to examine this statement and 
54 Bonner (1990) investigated the effect of task specific knowledge on audit experience and the 
knowledge differences between auditors from two different accounting firms. The results indicated 
knowledge differences and judgement differences as different audit firms possess different 
characteristics such as audit strategies. 
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also to investigate whether experts in internal control evaluations are also experts in 
other audit procedures such as analytical reviews and going concern judgements. 
Fifth, in this research project, only one group of students is selected to participate in 
the questionnaire. Bonner, Davis and Jackson (1992) examined expertise inferred 
from the level of performance in a specific task in relation to issues identification in 
tax planning. The level of expertise is dependent upon the educational background of 
individual subjects. Institutions can adopt case-oriented instructions or rule-oriented 
instructions. Graduates from different institutions will acquire different problem 
solving skills. As such, future research can investigate whether knowledge and 
performance differences can be attributed to differences in educational background. 
Sixth, the additional analysis identified 8 pairs of subjects who have highly correlated 
or lowly correlated omega squared, co2 . Future research could conduct an analysis 
involving all subjects and investigate in more depth the characteristics of the subject 
pairs with high or low (D2 correlation. Factors attributable to the correlation level can 
be identified. The level of knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight for the 2 
groups can be determined. Better performance is indicated by higher levels of 
knowledge accuracy, consensus and self insight. If subjects with high (0 2 correlation 
do exhibit better performance, the factors attributable to the highly correlated group 
can then be matched with the characteristics and abilities of the prospective 
employees during the screening process in the recruitment exercise of the accounting 
firms. This assists the accounting firms in selecting prospective employees with the 
maximum capabilities who will excel in the audit assignments. 
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Seventh, different tasks present different levels of complexity. A similar task but 
applied in different environments can also present different levels of complexity. For 
example, Part two of the questionnaire requires subjects to evaluate the internal 
control strength of the sixteen cases. Cases with all cues pre-answered "Yes" or "No" 
present less uncertainty to the subjects than cases with a combination of both "Yes" 
and "No" answers for the five cues. Future research can investigate if complexity is a 
factor in internal control evaluations and also whether auditors with extensive internal 
control audit experience perform better in more complex internal control tasks 
compared to auditors without extensive internal control audit experience. 
Finally, the results indicate no financial institution effect on the level of knowledge, 
accuracy, consensus and self insight. It should be noted that the financial disasters are 
recent occurrences and the auditors are only beginning to realise the consequences and 
importance of the internal control review function. Significant results could flow 
from a replication of this study in a few years when the current emphasis on internal 
controls has taken effect. 
As indicated from the above discussion, there is vast room for the study of audit 
expertise and many questions awaiting answers. 
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Appendix 1 : Model answer for Part two of the Questionnaire 
According to Tubbs (1994, p. 792), each of the eight errors/irregularities violated one 
internal control objective as follows: 
Valid. Auth. Compl. Value. 
I. Customers 	failed 	to pay 	within the discount 
period and remitted the payment in full. 
Nevertheless, discounts were approved , and the 
amount of the discounts were misappropriated. 
X 
2. Accounts 	receivable 	were 	aged 	incorrectly; 
potentially 	uncollectible 	amounts 	were 	not 
recognised.. 
X 
3. Billings 	were 	recorded 	but 	goods 	were 	not 
shipped. 
X 
4. Customer order specifications were not met as to 
type and/or quantity. 
X 
5. Lapping occurred. X 
6. Management, employees or third parties received 
goods without being billed. 
X 
7. Orders were in violation of the company's credit 
policies. 
X 
8. Revenues were recorded in current period when 
they should have been recorded in the next 
period. 
X 
Valid. = Validity (Recorded transactions are valid) 
The structure cannot permit the inclusion of fictitious or non-existent transactions in journals or other accounting records. 
Auth. = Authorisation (Transactions are properly authorised) 
If a transaction that is not authorised takes place, it could result in a fraudulent transaction, and it could also have the effect of 
wasting or destroying company assets. 
Compl. = Completeness (Existing transactions are recorded) 
The client's procedures must provide controls to prevent the omission of transactions from the records. 
Value. = Valuation (Transactions are properly valued) 
An adequate structure includes procedures to avoid errors in calculating transactions at various stages in the recording process. 
(adapted from Arens A. A., Loebbecke J. K., Best P. J. And Shailer G. E. P., Auditing in Australia : An Integrated Approach, 
Prentice Hall, 1990, p. 270) 
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misappropnated. 
The following provides further support for the model answer derived by Tubbs (1992) 
from a textbook source in relation to internal control objectives violated. 55 
1 Customers failed to pay within the discount period and -remitted the payment in 
full. Nevertheless, discounts were approved , and the amount of 	discounts were 
Internal control objective violated : Authorisation 
Proper Authorisation. 56 
The auditor is concerned about authorisation at three key points: 
• credit must be properly authorised before a sale takes place; 
• goods should be shipped only after proper authorisation; and 
• prices, including base terms, freight and discounts, must be authorised. 
The first two controls are meant to prevent loss of company assets by shipping to 
fictitious customers or those who fail to pay for the goods. Price authorisation is 
meant to make sure the sale is billed at the price set by company policy. 
. Accounts receivable were aged incorrectly, potentially unCollectible amounts were 
not recognised:. 
Internal control objective violated : Valuation 
Recorded sales are properly valued. 57 
The correct valuation of sales transactions concerns ... correctly recording the amount 
billed in the accounting period. 
55 Refer to Arens et al (1990). 
56 ibid, p 354. 
57 
 
ibid. p 357. 
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Custorrier order specifiaatfons were not net as to type andlor quantity. 
Internal control objective violated : Valuation 
Recorded sales are properly valued. 59 
The correct valuation of sales transactions concerns shipping the amount of goods 
ordered... 
:1Lapping ocenrre 
Internal control objective violated : Completeness 
Existing transactions are recorded. 61 
Cash received is recorded in the cash receipts journal. 
Billings were recorded but goods were not shipped. 
Internal control objective violated : Validity 
Recorded sales are valid. 58 
The auditor is concerned with ... sales being included in the journal for which no 
shipment was made... 
58 ibid. p. 355. 
59 ibid. p. 357. 
60 ibid, p. 362. Lapping is the postponement of entries for the collection of receivables to conceal an 
existing cash shortage. The fraud is perpetrated by a person who records cash in both the cash receipts 
journal and subsidiary accounts receivables ledger. Recording of cash receipts from one customer is 
deferred and the shortages is covered with receipts of another customer. These in turn are covered from 
the receipts of a third customer a few days later. The employee must continue to cover the shortage 
through repeated lapping, replace the stolen money or find another way to conceal the shortage. This 
fraud can be detected by comparing the name, amount and dates shown on remittance advices with cash 
receipts journal entries and related duplicate deposit slips. 
61 ibid. p. 360. 
Ill  
8 Revenues were recorded in current , period when they should have been recorded in , 
the next period. 
Internal control objective violated : Validity 
Recorded sales are valid. 64 
The auditor is concerned with ... sales being included in journals for which no 
shipment was made. 
Orders were in violation of the cornparir's credit policies. , 
Internal control objective violated : Authorisation 
Sales are properly authorised. 63 
It is necessary to test whether the company's general credit, shipping and pricing 
policies are being properly followed in the day-to day operations. 
Management, employees oithird.partieS received goods without being billed: 
Internal control objective violated : Completeness 
Existing sales transactions are recorded. 62 
The tracing of shipping document to sales invoice and journal is a test for unbilled 
shipment, omitted transactions (completeness objective). 
62 ibid, p. 356. 
ibid, p. 356. 
64 Ibid. p. 355. 
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Appendix 2 : The questionnaire used for distribution to auditor 
and student subjects 
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THE IMPACT OF AUDIT EXPERIENCE ON INTERNAL 
CONTROL EVALUATION 
Investigators 
Professor Jayne Godfrey 
University of Tasmania 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
GPO Box 252C 
Hobart Tasmania 7001 
Telephone : (002) 202278 
Fax 	: (002) 207845 
AARnet : 
Jayne.Godfrey @ accfin.utas.edu.au  
Ms Tong-Gunn Chew 
University of Tasmania 
Department of Accounting and Finance 
GPO Box 252C 
Hobart Tasmania 7001 
Telephone : (002) 202759 
Fax 	: (002) 207845 
AARnet : 
tg_chew@Postoffice.SandyBay.utas.edu.au  
Purpose of Study 
The study evaluates the impact of different types and levels of experience on the 
auditors' assessments of internal control risk. It will be used to provide data essential 
for the completion of Ms Chew's Masters dissertation and to report to the audit firms 
concerning the variables influencing the auditors' internal control evaluation. 
Criteria for Inclusion/Exclusion 
The only criterion for selection of practising subjects is that half of the sample should 
comprise auditors who have audited financial institutions and the other half should 
comprise auditors who have not audited financial institutions. 
Procedures for Completion of Questionnaire 
This questionnaire will be used to study the general internal control knowledge of the 
auditors with experience in different industries. The three-part questionnaire will 
require approximately thirty minutes to complete. On completion, please place the 
completed questionnaire in the envelope provided. You are entitled to withdraw from 
this study at any time without prejudice, but your participation will be greatly 
appreciated. 
Confidentiality 
DO NOT PUT YOUR NAME ON THIS QUESTIONNAIRE. All responses will be 
held in strict confidence, and anonymity is guaranteed for any publications and 
presentations based on the questionnaire responses. 
Concerns or Complaints 
This study has obtained approval from the University Ethics Committee. Should you 
encounter any concerns of an ethical nature or the manner in which the project is 
conducted, you may contact the Executive Officer, Ms Chris Hooper, of the 
University Ethics Committee (Human Experimentation) at: 
GPO Box 252C 
Hobart Tasmania 7001 
Telephone : (002) 202763 
Results 
The final results will be available upon request and distributed to the participating 
firms. 
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PART ONE 
Listed on the next page are eight errors/irregularities which could be detected during 
an audit of any of your client(s). For EACH of the eight errors/irregularities, identify 
the ONE internal control objective (validity, authorisation, completeness or valuation) 
that is of most concern to you, i.e., which objective was most violated allowing the 
error to occur. Place a tick in the appropriate box. TICK ONLY 1 BOX PER 
ROW. 
Valid. Auth. Compl. Value. 
1. Customers failed to pay within the discount period 
and remitted the payment in full. 	Nevertheless, 
discounts were approved, and the amount of the 
discounts was misappropriated. 
2. Accounts 	receivable 	were 	aged 	incorrectly; 
potentially 	uncollectible 	amounts 	were 	not 
recognised. 
3. Billings were recorded but goods were not shipped. 
4. Customer order specifications were not met as to 
type and/or quantity. 
5. Lapping occurred. 
6. Management, employees or third parties received 
goods without being billed. 
7. Orders were in violation of the company's credit 
policies. 
8. Revenues were recorded in the current period when 
they should be recorded in the next period. 
Valid. = Validity (Recorded transactions are valid) 
The structure cannot permit the inclusion of fictitious or non -existent transactions in journals or other accounting records. 
Auth. = Authorisation (Transactions are properly authorised) 
If a transaction that is not authorised takes place, it could result in a fraudulent transaction, and it could also have the effect of 
wasting or destroying company assets. 
Compl. = Completeness (Existing transactions are recorded) 
The client's procedures must provide controls to prevent the omission of transactions from the records. 
Value. = Valuation (Transactions are properly valued) 
An adequate structure includes procedures to avoid errors in calculating transactions at various stages in the recording process. 
(adapted from Arens A. A., Loebbecke J. K., Best P. J. and Shailer G. E. P., Auditing in Australia : An Integrated Approach, 
Prentice Hall, 1990, p 270) 
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PART TWO 
You are the auditor of BK Ltd. The company employs 70 to 110 factory personnel, 
depending upon production requirements. The company has its own payroll 
department which processes the payroll on a microcomputer using a popular 
commercial payroll package. The following questions are included in the internal 
control questionnaire on control procedures for payroll transactions in BK Ltd: 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, pay rates and 
actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle adequately 
separated? 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross pay amounts 
and deductions? 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of amounts stated 
in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
Set out in pages 4 to 11 are 16 different combinations of "yes" and "no" answers to 
each question. Assess the strength of the internal control structure of each case 
independently on a scale of 1 (extremely weak) to 7 (strong). 
[1 =extremely weak, 2=very weak, 3=substantial weakness, 4=some weakness, 
5=marginally adequate, 6=adequate, 7=strong] 
Indicate your assessment of each of the sixteen internal control structures by putting a 
circle round the number with the description which best corresponds to your 
evaluation. 
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CASE NO, 1 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 2 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 3 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 4 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 5 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
I 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 6 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 7 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	. 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 8 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 9 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 7 
CASE NO. 10 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 11 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 12 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 13 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 14 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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CASE NO. 15 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
CASE NO. 16 
Yes No 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, 
pay rates and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 
V 
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle 
adequately separated? 
V 
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross 
pay amounts and deductions? 
V 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 
V 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
V 
extremely 	 substantial 	some 	marginally 
weak 	very weak weakness weakness adequate adequate 	strong 
1 2 	3 	4 	5 	6 	7 
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PART THREE 
The following five internal control indicators were in each of the 16 cases presented in 
Part Two. They may have different levels of importance in the assessment of control 
risk. Please assess the relative importance of the internal control indicators by 
allocating 100 points (a higher point would indicate a higher level of importance) 
across the five indicators in the boxes provided on the right. 
e.g. 
Indicator 1 	X 
Indicator 2 	X 
Indicator 3 	X 	— These points must add up to 100. 
Indicator 4 	X 
Indicator 5 	X 
TOTAL 	100 
Internal Control Indicators 
1. Are formal procedures established for the authorisation of payroll, pay rates 
and actual hours worked (if applicable)? 	  
2. Are the tasks of authorisation and payment in the payroll cycle adequately 
separated? 	  
3. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of gross pay 
amounts and deductions? 
4. Are formal procedures established for independent reconciliation of 
amounts stated in payroll preparation and actual amounts paid? 	 
5. Are formal procedures established for internal verification of account 
classification? 
Level of 
Importance 
TOTAL 	100 
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PERSONAL DETAILS (FOR PRACTISING AUDITORS) 
CURRENT FIRM EXPERIENCE 
1) Type of Employer: (please circle) 
• international firm 
• national firm 
• local firm 
2) Total audit experience with the CURRENT firm: 
3) Current position held at firm: 	  
 
years 	months 
 
TOTAL AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
4) Total audit experience TO DATE: 	years 	 months 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
If you have experience in auditing financial institutions (banks, building societies and credit unions), 
please fill in the following section. 
5) Your first financial institution audit was conducted in (e.g. Jan'90): 	  
6) Total number of financial institution audits performed since then:  
Audited XYZ Ltd from fly 1993 to 1995 = 3 financial institution audits performed 
7) Your last financial institution audit was conducted in (e.g. Jan'96): 
COMPLIANCE Vs SUBSTANTIVE TESTING EXPERIENCE 
Throughout your audit career, you would have audited clients with reliable internal control structures 
whereby you plan extensive tests of controls and restricted substantive testing (compliance based); and 
clients without reliable internal control structures whereby you plan few tests of controls and extensive 
substantive testing (substantive based). 
10) Your total audit experience can be described as: (please circle) 
• predominantly compliance based 
• predominantly substantive based 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!! 
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PERSONAL DETAILS (FOR STUDENTS) 
1) Age band: (please circle) 
• less than 21 
• 21 - 30 
• 31 - 40 
• over 40 
2) Are you currently working in an accounting firm as an auditor? 
• if YES, answer the remaining questions 
• if NO, ignore the remaining questions 
CURRENT FIRM EXPERIENCE 
3) Type of Employer: (please circle) 
• international firm 
• national firm 
• local firm 
4) Total audit experience with the CURRENT firm: 	years 	months 
5) Current position held at firm: 	  
TOTAL AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
6) Total audit experience TO DATE: 
 
years 	 months 
 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTION AUDIT EXPERIENCE 
If you have experience in auditing financial institutions (banks, building societies and credit unions), 
please fill in the following section. 
7) Your first financial institution audit was conducted in (e.g. Jan'90): 	  
8) Total number of financial institution audits performed since then: 	  
Audited XYZ Ltd from f/y 1993 to 1995 = 3 financial institution audits performed 
9) Your last financial institution audit was conducted in (e.g. Jan'96): 
COMPLIANCE Vs SUBSTANTIVE TESTING EXPERIENCE 
Throughout your audit career, you would have audited clients with reliable internal control structures 
whereby you plan extensive tests of controls and restricted substantive testing (compliance based); and 
clients without reliable internal control structures whereby you plan few tests of controls and extensive 
substantive testing (substantive based). 
10) Your total audit experience can be described as: (please circle) 
• predominantly compliance based 
• predominantly substantive based 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!! 
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